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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is designed to be a primer for CC3001, a combat modeling course
at the Naval Postgraduate School for students in the Joint C3 curriculum. It provides
the students with a single document that ties together the concepts which the course
is designed to teach.
The purpose of this course is to give C3 students a background in combat
modeling and analysis. Since the end result of a combat model is, in general terms,
a "decision aid" for a commander who needs to make some kind of decision affecting
the troops under his control, it is important for the study of C3 to look at how these
models are constructed and how the results are utilized.
The course treats analysis of operations and battles, not the modeling of the
C2 process; it is about making better decisions, rather than the decision process.
This course outline is divided into nine chapters which deal with separate
issues of combat modeling. Chapter II develops a theory of combat to give students
a common reference for dealing with combat terminology. Also in Chapter II is a
set of definitions for discussing C3 which are based on the theory of combat
presented. In Chapter III the student is introduced to the various types of modeling,
and the modeling process. Chapter IV deals with selection of measures of
effectiveness (MOE), performance (MOP) and force effectiveness (MOFE). In
Chapter V the student is introduced to attrition modeling techniques using
Lanchester attrition equation. Chapter VI examines the history of naval combat as
and the attrition models that best emulate combat at sea in different situations. In
Chapter VII non-attrition models are examined and contrasted with the attrition
models presented. Chapter VIII looks at the current state of the art, including
several combat models located at the Naval Postgraduate School and elsewhere,
which have been used for extensive research. A summary is presented in Chapter IX
to review the concepts presented and examine the material in view of the follow on
courses the students of Command and Control will take.
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Each chapter begins with an introduction which outlines the objectives of the
chapter in simple bullet statements. A list of outside readings is presented to
supplement the lectures. Following the list of readings is a section which examines
each of the objectives in more detail to provide the student with the general idea
behind each objective so that the student will have a feeling for what material should
be obtained from each of the readings and how the objectives are related to each
other.
The reading for Chapter II is contained within the chapter in order to condense
several separate works into one document and tie together a theory of combat with
a C3 terminology for use throughout this course.
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II. COMMAND AND CONTROL & COMBAT THEORY
AIM:
Provide the student a background in combat theory, analysis and modeling.
Present the student with a useable theory of combat. Present definitions of C2 and
C3 which support the combat theory. Explore the role of combat analysis in making
C2 decisions to support effective combat.
OBJECTIVES:
Introduce the role of combat analysis as it applies to command and control
decision making
Develop the theory of combat to be discussed in this course
* Define and illustrate force
** Discuss combat process and how these processes have measurable results
Define the different types of combat potential - designed and available
* Link co: cept of combat power on two sides with measurable results and an
outcome of a battle
* Present the fundamental equation of combat power
Provide definitions of Command and Control as a framework for applying the
theory of combat
* Define command, command and control and a C2 system
* Discuss the functions of command -- organization, motivation, decision and
execution
* Discuss role of C2 countermeasures as they apply to combat
3
READINGS:
1. Frank Snyder, Command and Control: Readings and Commenta=y Session
1, Command and War, pp. 11-19.
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A. OBJECTIVES FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL AND THEORY OF
COMBAT
The purpose of this course is to give the student a background in combat
modeling and analysis. The specific tools of modeling are not emphasized in this
course as much as the principles and application of combat models to military
environments. The end result of a combat model is derived from the combat analysis
performed. The purpose of combat analysis is to provide a decision maker with a
tool (aid) for making more informed decisions concerning his force employment and
tactics.
In order to understand how combat models are "built" and used, it is necessary
to understand some theory of combat and the unique terms associated with combat.
The theory presented in this course outline was developed by The Military Conflict
Institute for its general membership and is condensed in this paper.
E are those elements which are assigned to perform some function or
activity directed against a given element or target. A commander may activate his
forces causing a collection of activities to begin which in themselves cause processes
that result in some measurable outcome. The combination of these activities creates
what is called combat power.
The capacity for forces to successfully engage in combat is measured in cmbat
potential. The combat potential of forces can be measured in terms of their designed
and available potential. The designed combat potential of forces is a measurement
of the capacity of those forces to engage in combat given ideal training, equipment,
S
organization and motivation. The available combat potential is a measurement of the
current state of the forces with respect to training, equipment, organization and
motivation.
£QmaL Rwr is the lethal means by which one side attempts to change the
states of the forces of the other side. The end result of the collection of processes
is some synthesized expression, or measure, called an outcome.
The fundamental equation of combat power is suitable for explaing how the
forces and the activities assigned to each element are transformed into combat
power. The general form of the equation is: P = F {m, u}, where "P" represents
combat power, "m" represents the number of forces of a specific type, "u" is the rate
of their activity, and "F" is the command function which governs m and u.
In order to understand how combat analysis is useful in Command and Control
decision making, the definitions of Command and Control must be structured in
such a way to reflect the theory of combat presented. The definitions provided in
JCS Pub 1 (see page 17) provide a basis for the more useful definitions developed
in the next section.
In terms of the theory of combat, cmmand is the function of generating
combat potential through a collection of the activites of organization, motivation,
decision, and execution. The commander is responsible for ensuring that this
function is properly carried out. Command and control is the process by which
orders to activate these forces are carried out such that some measurable combat
power may be generated. A command and control system is the collection of
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personnel, equipment and procedures the commander uses to facilitate the process
of command and control.
In examining the collection of all processes each side employs to generate
measureable combat power, the role of C2 countermeasures may be seen as the
activity of impeding the enemy's ability to effectively activate his forces, resulting in
a smaller contribution to the enemy's overall combat power.
B. PURPOSE OF STUDYING C3 AND A THEORY OF COMBAT
One of the most unique areas of interest to arise in military studies in recent
years is the increased attention given to the phenomena of command and control.
While command and control activities have always been present in military
organizations, military theorists, strategists, analysts, and professionals now devote
more time and resources to increasing the awareness of military organizations to the
vast opportunities associated with improving command and control operations and
facilities.
Although the terminology appears at first glance to be simple and self-defining,
many different definitions of terms and concepts continue to exist among theorists
and practitioners of command and control. There is, however, one common and
simple idea present in each of these definitions - that command and control involves
someone who is responsible for making decisions concerning his organization and
causes those decisions to be carried out. Decision making and execution, in whatever
circumstance considered, can be taken as a basis for any command and control
definition.
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The kind of decision which must be made, and its execution, is unique to
military organizations due to the very nature of military forces and the deadly
environment in which these decisions are made. Military organizations are created
and maintained for one reason - to carry out the mission oriented activities and
processes associated with armed conflict. Whether a military unit is formed in
response to an existing threat or maintained in preparation to meet an expected or
possible threat, any decision made concerning the organization can ultimately be
reduced to one concept -- how do the possible choices affect the ability of forces to
conduct armed conflict? Consider the following two examples of decision making:
CASE I: The CNO has to allocate money to one of two proposals before him. The
first alternative is to invest money in research and development for a new generation
of communication systems which will improve abilities of surface ships to
communicate with submarines. The second alternative is to use the same money to
improve the communications equipment on aging ships with communications
equipment using current technology. The more fundamental question the CNO must
consider is not a least cost or technical efficiency question but rather, how will the
ability to conduct battle be improved in each case and which decision provides the
greatest increase in fighting ability per dollar spent.
CASE II: A battalion commander engaged in low intensity combat in a European
theatre is responsible for a 100 mile front. As fresh troops arrive in the theatre as
reinforcements, the commander must decide where to place the troops in the
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theatre. The decision he makes -- the placement of troops -- is ultimately based on
a belief that his decision will result in an increased ability of his organization to
conduct combat activities as a result of the troop placement.
In deciding how best to improve the ability of a military organization to
conduct armed conflict at any given time one must be able to determine the relative
worth of seemingly unrelated things. How does the CNO measure the value of a
new communications system versus an upgraded communications system for the
same ship? What is the result measured in combat potential of placing reserve
troops 50 miles or 10 miles from an active front?
Within these questions lies a basic question every military professional is tasked
with justifying: how can the benefits be measured for the different choices and
opportunities currently being considered? Although this is certainly not a question
which is limited to the military environment, the approach taken to answer the
question is unique to military organizations. It is technically simple to determine
the differences between two communication systems or to explain the differences in
moving troops to specified locations, but the real problem lies in trying to assign a
measure of effectiveness (MOE) to each possible case and to choose from that the
best alternative using some means of analysis.
To be able to assign different values to different possibilities and make a
decision which affects the ability of the organization to fight is, in fact, the basis for
a command and control system. To evaluate what may appear to be unrelated factors
and determine what action to take to maintain, if not improve, the readiness of the
9
organization to accomplish its mission, which is ultimately a mission of conflict, is
the heart of command and control.
Having some idea now of a generalized purpose of command and control, we
must now consider how to analyze different alternative courses of action. One means
to analyze different alternatives is to model the effects of alternatives in a manner
which is suited to the factors involved. In the case of military organizations the
unique environment requires a unique approach to solving the problem. Since World
War II, a branch of operations research, combat modeling, has arisen as a result of
efforts in this field. No other profession deals with lethal two-sided competition in
the way ours does. It applies scientific methods to combat scenarios and develops
tools, called models, for simulating the environment, the processes, and the outcomes
of the engagements.
Before being able to understand how combat models can be used to solve the
command and control problems facing an organization, a common understanding
of some terms used must be reached. Specifically one must have: (1) a simple
understanding of the theory of combat to be able to apply models to a situation, (2)
an understanding of what command and control means in the specific context of
combat, and (3) an understanding of what models are. With this information the
reader will see how command and control depends on combat modeling and analysi
to make appropriate decisions.
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C. COMBAT THEORY
The theory of combat and definition of C3 terms which are presented in this
chapter was developed by The Military Conflict Institute, and expanded upon by
Wayne P. Hughes in his paper "Command and Control Within the Framework of a
Theory of Combat". The premise of the theory is that combat is a complex
interaction of force-on-force activities. The concept is developed by first examining
the smallest part of the military organization and building upon this structure to
develop the material necessary to understand the basis of force-on-force interaction.
1. Definition Of Forces
All military organizations are comprised of flQ which are the actual
instruments of combat, specifically, personnel and equipment. Each element of a
foc may be described by a set of attributes which give details about the current
state of an element. The attributes may include such items as the following: number
of personnel in each element, weapons in unit, ammunition available, accuracy of
personnel firing weapons, motivating factors for the unit, geographic location of unit,
etc. The state of these elements will be important later in developing the theory
further.
These forces may be assembled together in groups with common combat
fnctions, which the units will perform as aciii. These functions may in general
be categorized into one of the following:
* Commanding forces and their activities.
* Controlling the activities.
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" Gathering information for the command, control, and firing processes.
" Moving troops and units from place to place.
" Supplying the consumable goods and hardware to various locations.
" Delivering firepower to the enemy.
* Disrupting the combat functions of the enemy.
2. Force Functions And Activities
The combat functions are responsibilities or roles played by forces. They
are the means with which to fight against a notional enemy without any knowledge
of who the enemy is or where the battle will take place. The functions are defined
independent of the environment in which any actual battle may occur.
In combat each element of a force will perform acions based on the
function assigned to the element (by command), the current state of the element
(capability of the element at a given time) and the attributes of the element. For
example, an AAW unit will perform actions against enemy aircraft, but it is not
expected to take effective action against enemy infantry or armor. The effect of the
actions taken by the element is to cause some change in the state of the enemy as
well as the unit itself. This change in state caused by an element-action-element
exchange is known as a comba t y. The result of these activities is some change
in state which can measured. For example the effect of an AAW unit firing at an
approaching aircraft is a depletion of ammunition for the firing unit and a possible
loss of aircraft for the enemy. Activities such as the delivery of fire, can be
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quantified and measured but the reader should not think of any function as
generating combat results.
Note that to this point we have talked only about the effect of one side
on the other. The second side is also usually delivering fire in return, so that there
is a total force-on-force effect.
3. Combat As A Collection Of Processes
The collective activities of the forces on both sides are combined into a
combat process which can be measured as results. The collective firepower activities
of the functional elements of a force and the countermeasures employed by the
enemy have net effects (such as attrition, suppression, retreat, or other movement)
on the enemy. The results of the collection of the activities of all the functional
groups are changes in states of the forces on both sides.
4. Combat Potential
The capacity of a given force to engage successfully in combat against an
enemy is called its combat pQtential. There are two types of combat potential which
describe the state of a force. The designed combat potential of a force is a measure
of the capacity of a given force to be effective in combating a known enemy given
optimal training, equipment, motivation, organization and leadership. Design
potential assumes that the forces perform as designed and intended, with a complete
understanding of who the enemy is and the geographical location of the battlefield.
With this information the force will be optimally fitted to the specific battle and has
ideally perfect capacity to conduct the armed conflict in question. The available
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combat Vtential of a force is the current capacity of a force at any given point in
time to be effective in combating an enemy given existing levels of training,
equipment, motivation, organization and leadership. Obviously, the capacity for a
force to conduct warfare at any given time against a specific enemy will be less than
its designed capacity due to imperfect levels of training, equipment, organization,
and an imperfect knowledge of the battlefield location and motivation of the enemy.
The available combat potential will thus be measured as some factor between 0.0
and 1.0 of the designed combat potential.
5. Measurement Of Combat Power
The lethal effectiveness delivered by forces is a result of those forces
being activated by command against an enemy. This is the quantity called combat
p and is a result of forces engaging enemy forces at a given time and location.
Combat power is generated against an enemy as a result of forces carrying out
combat actions against the enemy based upon a commander's activation of his forces
utilizing a command and control process. The combat power is generated from
available combat potential of the forces involved but does necessarily consume the
potential of the forces in the way that energy is consumed from a battery during its
use.
The original concept presented for what is combat may now be examined
based upon the previous discussion. Forc (or combat effectiveness) against an
enemy will result from the collection of combat activities, grouped as combat
processes, but only the enemy's attenuating zountermeasures are taken into account.
The forces on both sides produce some measurable change in the states of both
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sides. In summary, the effect of both sides conducting these operations results in a
complex interaction of lethal force-on-force which has measurable results we identify
as combat.
6. Fundamental Equation Of Combat Power
Having an understanding of combat, the next step is to develop an
equation for determining the relationship between the entity we desire to measure
- combat power -- and the independent variables involved. The fund mental
equation of combat power for tacticians and theorists is of the form: P = F {m , u}.
The quantity, combat power [P], derives from the mission-specific
relationship between force elements [m] and the kind and time rate of their activities
[u]. The function [F] governs the pattern of the elements' activities, so is called the
command function. In other words, when the commander activates his elements of
combat potential, the "pattern" is the tasks they perform. By pattern is meant what
each element is doing (firing, scouting, maneuvering, communicating, etc.), where it's
doing it (flank, front, rear, enemy's rear, entrenched, etc.), and how well it's doing
it (rate of fire, rate of search, speed of movement, effectiveness of communications,
etc.). Since activities and combat power usually have a geographical direction or
orientation, they may be shown as vectors.
In the operational sense, it is the pattern as well as the number of forces
and rate of activity that determines the combat power of one side. In the analytical
sense, a model that best describes the pattern of activity is chosen and is used to
compute the quantity of combat power delivered.
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But the effect of side A's combat power on side B depends in part on
defensive actions by B's elements (entrenching, jamming, evasion, withdrawal, etc.).
This is why we must distinguish combat functions ordered and performed by side A
(which create raw combat power) from the two-sided process that determines the
effective combat power (or "force" as it is often called in literature). Effective power
by side A causes observable results, such as casualties to B, or his suppression,
retreat, or surrender.
B's countermeasures to lessen the effects of A's combat power are not the
same as B's offensive activities that generate his own combat power against A.
Combat is a force-on-force activity because A and B are both creating combat power
and attenuating the effect of their opponents' combat power.
It is the role of a commander to (a) govern the pattern of his forces'
activities and (b) do so with regard for the probable pattern of enemy activity. It is
the role of a combat analyst to discern probable patterns of both sides and model
them in a way that will result in better command decisions.
D. COMMAND AND CONTROL
Command and control has about as many definitions as there are users. The
reason for the different definitions is the many cases in which command and control
is applied. A terminology to be used when discussing command and control which
bridges some of the existing definitions will be presented which is consistent with the
combat theory presented, and is a summary of a paper by Wayne Hughes titled
"Command and Control Within a Framework of a Theory of Combat."
16
1. Definition Of Terms
As a starting point take the JCS Pub I definition of command and control:
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander
over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and
control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel,
equipment, communications, facilities and procedures which are employed by
a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and controlling forces and
operations in the accomplishment of the mission.
An important weakness of the JCS definition is that there are many functions
performed by the commander long before the combat mission is known. The
generalized JCS definition is directed towards missions and operations and does not
include all the preparatory actions which are involved prior to performing these
missions. The JCS definition is, however, a useful place to start to develop a useable
concept of command and control.
The JCS definition contains three different notions. The first is the
concept of "the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission." This is a
general statement of what command is for: its function. The second idea is that of
".. the functions performed .. and employed by a commander", which will serve as a
basis for the definition of the command and control process. The third idea
contained in the definition is the ".. arrangement of personnel, equipment, (etc.) ..."
which is a perception of the physical entities that make up a command and control
system. Each of these will now be looked at separately.
Command as taken from the JCS definition is the all encompassing
responsibility associated with "the exercise of authority and direction by a properly
17
designated commander". To command a force from the inception of that force to
the execution of operation orders requires functions including organizai gn
motivation, decision and execution.
2. The Function Of Command
The command function that is applicable to all levels of military
organizations must necessarily include these functions of organization, motivation,
decision and execution. There are other categories of command which can be offered
such as training and education but they may be considered as a subset of one of the
four categories already presented.
In light of the theory of combat presented, command is the all
encompassing function which generates the designed and available combat potential.
Through the subfunctions of organizing, motivating, deciding and executing, a
commander brings his forces from some untrained or otherwise unready condition
to a point where the available combat potential of the forces is as near as possible
to its designed combat potential. The readiness of the forces prior to executing an
operation is the responsibility of commanders at many echelons and is accomplished
through the function of command.
3. The C2 Process
We can also look to the JCS definition of command and control to derive
a partial definition of what is meant by command and control in the "process
employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and centrolling
forces in the accomplishment of the mission." These are the actions taken by the
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commander to transform the combat potential of forces (generated by the function
of command) into the realized combat power resulting from carrying out mission
orders. Thus command and control is the process of achieving measurable combat
_ower. while command is the function of generating combat potential by means of
the collection of actions of organization, motivation, decision and execution.
It is important for the theory of combat that we distinguish command and
control as a process of transformation, not just a function, or responsibility, to govern
everything under a command. Command and control affects all elements in a
command only to the point that the elements are part of the command and control
system (a definition provided below) and the measured actions carried out by the
elements are part of the command and control process. Command and control
cannot be thought of as everything involved in combat. The process of ordering a
battery to fire weapons from the moment the order is given until the time the
gunner is ready to fire is contained within the command and control process. What
happens when the artillery is fired and the results are achieved by the weapon is
called combat. In this sense combat is an all encompassing term. Command governs
all the actions of its forces, but command and control is not everything in combat.
4. Information Collection
One other exception to some definitions of command and control involves
the function of information gathering. The activities associated with information
gathering, including detection, classification, tracking, targeting, etc., are directed as
part of the command function. Indeed, how the decision is made to distribute forces
to collect this information is a vital decision which a commander must make. How
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the information is interpreted once collected and deciding what actions will be taken
based on the information is indeed a command and control process but the actions
of collecting the information is best thought of not as part of the command and
control process, but as a separate process in its own right: information collection.
This point is extremely important in current command and control problems as we
will see later.
S. A C2 System
Having presented definitions for the command function and the command
and control process, the third step is to define a command and control system. The
JCS Pub. 1 definition provides an adequate definition by emphasizing "..the
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures
which are employed by the commander..". A command and control system contains
all the tangible items used to perform the process defined above. The cmmaud and
control ytem then is composed of:
1. phyical elements - transmitters used to broadcast orders, signal lights and
flags, computers, code books and tapes, deciphering equipment, etc;
2. human elements -- the commander himself, communications staff, military
analysts in the chain of command, etc.;
3. procedural elements - used to conduct the processes - training manuals,
equipment manuals, procedural manuals for a fleet, organization charts and
command relationships.
A command and control system is used to facilitate the process of
command and control. It is important to note the inclusion of the commander
himself in the system definition. Without a commander to make decisions the system
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cannot perform its function, so we must include the commander as part of the very
system he uses. Even when the environment is a lone soldier in a battlefield making
decisions about himself, there exists a "commander", the soldier, and a system to
help him make some decision about the action he must take.
6. Role Of C2 Countermeasures
Another area which needs defining for the theory of combat to be
complete is command and control countermeasures. If we define command and
control as the process of transforming combat potential into combat power, then
command and control countermeasures are those activities which a force engages in
to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's command and control. These
countermeasures are actions which cause the enemy's command and control
elements to be ineffective such as jamming radios, providing misleading intelligence
and other such activities which help to confuse the enemy's perception of the
battlefield.
A command and control countermeasures system includes the equipment
and personnel whose activity is to carry out countermeasures such as the
communications jammer and the associated operator.
E. MODELING
It was during World War II that military operations research gained its place
as an emerging science. After the war the writings of Morse, Kimball, Blackett, and
others who had analyzed military situations and phenomena spurred the creation of
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modem military operations research. This was the first time that analysts used
scientific principles applied to the environment of combat with outstanding success.
Prior to World War II there was not a school of thought or formal organization
devoted to analysis of military actions or conditions, but during World War H
scientists "went to war". Some became involved very early in field operations, most
notably with radar in the air Battle of Britain. From there it was natural that they
should involve themselves with the tactical employment of sensors and weapons.
Thus operations research was born. The works of Morse and Kimball, presented in
The Methods of Operation Research, 1946, still stand as a cornerstone in the field
of combat modeling and analysis.
A m applied to any situation, is merely a "simplified representation of the
entity it imitates or simulates." The goodness of a model lies in how well it achieves
its purpose. It is fair to say that the closer it approximates the real world entity it
represents, the greater its value. But models do not reproduce war, and attempts to
do so have led to overwhelming complexity with little to show for it. Complexity per
se has little to do with utility in practice.
A feature of modeling is that the model is prepared with a specific need in
mind to serve the client for whom the model is built. In the case of military
modeling the client may be, for example, the JCS which desires to have a model
created to explore the effects of nuclear detonations in an unlimited war. It is
important to specify who the client is, and the person served by the model must have
a fair idea of how it works and how well it fits his needs. We say a model is
"decision oriented."
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In developing models there are general steps which must be taken by the client
as well as the modeler. In Work and Method of Operations Analysis Robert






These five steps are crucial in developing adequate models for military applications.
For the purposes of this course, the client wil be taken to mean a person who
is in a position of command and who must make decisions. Perception of the
problem as put forth by a client and as understood by the modeler lays the basis for
providing a useful model as a tool for the ultimate goal of analysis. The modeler
needs to understand the context for which the model is being developed. Most
analyses are not intended to give a single solution as end products. Typically the
result is an IF-THEN statement: if such-and-such are the inputs then so-and-so will
be the results.
Formulation of the client's problem is accomplished by four actions. First,
determine the objectives of the operation. Second, list the alternative courses of
actions. Sometimes the list must include both one's own and the enemy's choices.
Third, define a measure of effectiveness by which to compare the alternatives.
Fourth, determine the variables that are regarded as critical, list them, and figure
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out how they interact so that the relationships can be modeled during the steps
called analysis. An agreement of the problem statement, the data available for the
model and the assumptions which will be made are determined in this step prior to
collecting the data and modeling the client's needs.
The next step, observation, requires collecting data to be used in the model
and the environment which the model is attempting to emulate. This may often
cause a reformulation of the problem if obvious changes are required to accurately
describe the environment.
During the analysis and presentation steps the analyst combines his working
model with the observable data in a way that "models" the situation. The user ought
to participate as this is done to ensure that the model truly describes the situation.
It should be pointed out that this process may be cyclical or even done in
another order. No matter what sequence, it remains necessary that each step be
carried out and that the client be involved throughout. Military models are generally
developed to assist in decision making. As pointed out earlier, most models do not
provide a definitive answer but compare alternative choices according to an MOE.
Four major modeling techniques to fit a particular situation are available:
1. Analytical representations,
2. Computer simulations,
3. Arrangement of war gaming tools and personnel,
4. Field experiments.
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The pros and cons of each technique and may be found in MiMi ModeIing, The
Military Operations Research Society, Second Edition, 1989, pages 1-36.
Some examples of model types listed for military applications include: models
by application or purpose (battle planning, wartime operations, weapon procurement,
force sizing, etc.), models by scope or scale (micro or single unit engagement models,
multi-engagement models), ad hoc and standing models and models to describe,
prescribe and predict.
The use of all the above techniques when applied to military operations
analysis has added a scientific grounding for making command and control decisions.
This course will help to understand how modeling and analysis aid in making better
command and control decisions based on increasing our combat power and
diminishing that of the enemy.
F. COMBAT MODELING AS A TOOL FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL
Having defined the terminology associated with combat, command and control,
and modeling, the next step is to discuss how they interact with each other.
As stated above, command and control refers to a process of transforming
combat potential into combat power. The function of command is to generate
maximum combat potential. Making the decisions that will increase either the
combat potential or combat power of a force involves some sort of analysis. The
analysis techniques and tools used vary from situation to situation.
As an example, consider the following case. A fleet commander embarked in
a flagship must decide how to assign ships in the fleet to various tasks (Le.,
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functions) while steaming to battle. During the oceanic transit, surveillance is of
most concern to the admiral. The admiral is faced with deciding how he will allocate
aircraft between being combat ready and providing surveillance and scouting.
In this example the system to be modeled is the battle group containing the
aircraft carriers, battleships, and support ships. Inputs to the system include:
available aircraft of different types, fuel availability, pilots available and nonorganic
surveillance data including remote sensors, satellites, etc., as resources. In addition
to the resources available, other inputs are present including: rules of engagement
(ROE) and directions from higher authority requiring the admiral to keep remain
undetected during the transit. The output from the combat model analysis should
help determine the surveillence and strike aircraft based upon the surveillence
information gathered and other applicable reports.
The admiral must decide what his choices are, what tradeoffs exist, and what
vlues for the measure of effectiveness for the situation should be. Using a certain
aircraft for surveillance means that the aircraft is not available for a strike if it
should be required. For his MOE, the admiral chooses to base his decisions on his
ability to provide "sufficient" surveillance while retaining "sufficient" strike power.
The role of combat analysis is now to simulate the battle group with a highly
specialized model which the admiral can use to change the number of aircraft used
for surveillance as well as their search plan (radial and circumferential coverage)
and see the resulting probability of detecting air, surface, and subsurface attackers.
At the same time he has a strike plan, derived from analysis, which tells him how
many aircraft will be necessary to attack a variety of targets. The combat modeler
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must be familiar with the interrelationships between all the input variables to
provide an accurate model for the admiral. The admiral still retains full
responsibility of a final judgement and decision.
The ability to determine these interrelationships requires experience not
normally found in business or other type modeling. Due to the very nature of
combat, specialists in the field of combat analysis must be used who are familiar
with the various relationships that exist and the "laws" governing these relationships.
This is the art of combat analysis and the trait that those in a position of command
seek out to help them make decisions unique to the military environment.
The goal of this course is to provide the student with a background in the
understanding of these combat modeling tools and techniques and an ability to work
with the analysts who provide useful information to the commander.
G. REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. Distinguish between a function and a process as it relates to combat.
2. Define the terms command, command and control, and command and control
system.
3. Identify the elements of a command and control system. What is an
element's "state"? Explain why a surveillance system should not be considered
as a component of the command and control system.
4. Describe the significance of the three components of the "element-action-
element" model of combat. How ax. the two elements related? Is this a
model of a process or a function?
5. Is it possible to measure combat force directly? Identify two alternate
methods of measuring combat force.
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6. Explain the difference between designed combat potential and available
combat potential. Give several factors which may account for differences
between the two potentials.
7. The fundamental equation of combat power defines combat power as a
function of missions (actions) to be performed and units (elements) to
perform those missions. How does command and control enter into this
function and what are the effects of command and control on achieved
combat power?
8. You have been told that the use of command and control countermeasures




Provide the student with an understanding of the various types of models and
the characteristics of these models. Emphasize the fact that modeling is a product
to aid the decision maker. Discuss the role of the modeler in useful analysis.
OBJECTIVES:
* Definition of a model
Purpose of modeling is to support decision making to improve performance
and make better decisions
Discuss the general uses of models - as a decision aid, research tool, and a
training tool
* Understand characteristics of a good model
Discuss the types of models
* Discuss the modeling process
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Discuss the factors affecting model validity - faulty data, faulty model and
faulty reasoning or logic
* Effective combat modeling must be accomplished by "professionals"
Emphasize the limitations of models
* Distinguish between approximation and abstraction
All models are IF - THEN statements - importance of assumptions
Discuss methods and consequences of data collection
88 Understand the effect of the wartime setting on data collection
* Definition of "dirty data"
Discuss the principles of proper model selection
* Emulate the physical phenomenon
** Keep the model simple, yet adequate (apply reasonableness test)
* Keep decision to be made in view -- ensure model reflects the decision
READINGS:
1. Hughes, Militar Modeling, pp. 1-48.
2. Levis, "Modeling and Measuring Effectiveness of C2 Systems", pp. 15-17.
3. Giordano and Weir, A First Course in Mathematical Modeling pp. 29-40.
4. Wylie, "The Calculation of Risk".
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5. Morse and Kimball, Methods of Operations-Research, pp. 38 and 52-53 (see
the readiings for Chapter IV).
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A. DEFINITION AND PURPOSE OF MODELING
"A Model is a simplified representation of the entity it imitates or simulates"
[Hughes, Military Modeling. pg. 1]. The goal of modeling is to strip away the
superfluous detail and complexity of reality and lay bare the underlying variables,
constants and relationships in order to draw conclusions, make predictions or support
decision making. Specifically, the aim of military modeling is the study of combat
forces to support decision making relevant to force structure and force employment.
The purpose of military modeling, and modeling in general, is to provide a more
solid basis for decision maldng with the goal of improving performance and the
quality and timeliness of decisions made. "A model is useful if a better decision can
be made with the information that it adds" [Hughes, Milita Modeling, pg. 17].
B. USE OF MODELS
Three fundamental uses of military models are decision aids, research tools,
and training tools. The principal applications of these tools deals with the following
force structure concerns [Hughes, Military Modelinu pp. 23-33]:
1. Battle Planning -- to improve tactics, operations or force composition.
2. Wartime Operations - to solve time-sensitive questions.
3. Weapon Procurement -- to apply principles of systems analysis to yield cost-
effective selection of competing weapon systems.
4. Force Sizing -- to help determine force mix, identify or establish trends, or
project future requirements.
5. Human Resources Planning - to support management decision making
primarily in the area of personnel and training.
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6. Logistics Planning -- to project logistics requirements and optimize logistics
support.
7. National Policy Analysis - to assess the impact of broader policy decisions
on military concerns.
Since models are used to support decision making, their utility is most beneficial
when they accomplish one or more of the following [Hughes, Miti Modei pg
14]:
1. explore issues in an orderly way,
2. structure and discipline the debate,
3. compare and contrast alternatives,
4. reveal new characteristics,
5. lead to unexpected, but valid conclusions.
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF GOOD MODELS
The principal measure of a model's usefulness is its ability to communicate the
attributes of the phenomena under study. The ability to communicate is constrained
by several characteristics, the foremost of which are transparency, flexibility, and
reproducibility [Hughes, Milita Modeling, pg. 24]. Transparency refers to the ease
with which the intended user can understand the model and its results. Simplicity
and transparency both facilitate model modification. Flexibility refers to the ease
with which a model can be adapted to varying situations, as well as wide ranges of
input data. Reproducibility refers to the ability of a model to generate the same
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results using the same data each time the model is applied. Additionally, the results
must be independent of the individual that applies the model. Militay Modeg lists
a total of 14 characteristics of military models based on findings of the Army Models
Review Committee (AMRC) [Hughes, Miita Modlin pg. 7]. However these
three, flexibility, transparency and reproducibility, together with relevancy (roughly,
how much insight is enough) provide a framework for measuring a model's utility
and validity.
Though credibility is a characteristic unto itself, according to the AMRC,
Alexander Levis sets it in the forefront of model evaluation issues [Levis, "Modeling
& Measuring Effectiveness of C3 Systems"]. Levis holds that the credibility of a
model is a function of its coherence, corresponding clarity, and workability. These
address the extent to which the model variables and assumptions are verified, the
degree to which the model outputs agree with anticipated outcomes, and the ease
with which the model communicates the problem analysis. The ultimate test of a
model's credibility is the willingness of the decision maker to apply the result of
the model in sensitive analysis.
D. THE ANALYSIS AND MODELING PROCESS
The fundamental methodology of model development follows closely the
classical approach to scientific problem solving. One approach to this methodology
is described by Clayton Thomas [Hughes, Militar Modellin pg. 63] where he
discusses the findings of Robert Dorfman, who recall, divides the analysis process
into five stages:
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1. Perception - recognition that a problem exists and the generation of a
problem statement.
2. Formulation - determination "f what is to be measured and the generation
of a hypothesis, frequently expressed as a measurement of effectiveness.
3. Observation - collection of data upon which to validate the model or
generate conclusions.
4. Analysis - test the hypothesis against the observed data.
5. Presentation - recommendation of a course of action or decision based upon
analysis of data and hypothesis.
A similar approach to modeling is given by Giordano and Weir [Giordano and
Weir, A First Course in Mathematical Modeling. pp. 29-40] where the generation of
an acceptable model is the result of an iterative application of the following steps:
1. Identify the problem,
2. Make assumptions -- determine variables, constants and relationships,
3. Interpret the model - state in concise terms,
4. Verify the model -- check reasonableness and validity of results,
5. Implement the model,
6. Maintain the model.
The heart of modeling lies with the correct identification of the problem or
situation to be studied and the correct identification of the more significant variables
and the relationships between them. "The great art of modeling is to identify the
primary relationships pertinent to the issue, isolate them, and study their effects"
[Hughes, Miliar Modeling- pg. 14].
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E. FACTORS AFFECTING MODEL VALIDITY
Three principal factors which may cause a model to be invalid are faulty
reasoning or logic, a faulty model, or faulty data.
Faulty reasoning or logic results from incorrectly identifying the problem to be
studied or omitting significant variables pertinent to the problem. The modeler's
judgement and expertise are critical to successful model generation [Hughes, Mimt
ModeIing pg. 41]. See Capt. Wylie's article for an example of faulty reasoning in
model generation. Hughes holds that combat modeling must be accomplished by
professionals.
F. UNDERSTANDING THE LIMITATIONS OF MODELS
A faulty model results from the failure to identify the correct objective
statement (measurement standard) for a given problem statement. See M ze and
Kimbai's analysis [pp. 52-53] of antiaircraft guns on merchant ships as an example.
Secondly, because models are based on limiting assumptions they become IF-THEN
statements [Hughes, Military Modeling, pp. 43-48]. This means that as long as the
limiting assumptions hold then the model may be valid. However, when the model
is used outside the bounds of its limiting assumptions the results must be suspect. A
third factor in model validity is the notion of approximation and abstraction. Payne
differentiates between these two notions and identifies their impact on model validity
[Hughes, Militay Mdeling, pg. 315]. He points out that at best models only partly
and incompletely represent reality and their accuracy is a function of the model's
fidelity. The result will be errors because the model is less than - only an
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abstraction of - the thing it represents. Additionally, the error due to mathematical
calculations, according to Giordano and Weir, can be attributed to round off error
(computer induced), and truncation error (a finite representation of an infinitely
series of terms) [Giordano and Weir, A First Course in Mathematical Modelin. pg.
89]. These computational errors are what Payne calls approximations.
Abstraction errors are the result of limiting the complexity of the real situation
to a level which can be modeled. Thus, factors which may be relevant to the
situation being modeled may be omitted from the model in order to keep the model
understandable and workable. Giordano and Weir term this phenomenon as
"formulative error".
In some cases the abstraction may also be deliberate: the analyst may view the
additional "error" as acceptable because the model's accuracy is only rough to begin
with and the simplification aids in computations. Linear programming is an example
of a powerful optimization technique that assumes that linear relationships always
exist between variables; this is always a chancy assumption when modeling the real
world, but it is good enough in many circumstances.
G. DATA COLLECTION
Faulty data may affect the model in several ways. First, if inaccurate data is
used to generate the model the assumption made regarding relationships between
variables based upon the sample data may be inaccurate. Secondly, if inaccurate data
is used to verify or validate a model, the model may be certified which when used
with more accurate data may generate faulty conclusions. Giordano and Weir terms
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this limitation on model accuracy as "measurement errors" [Giordano and Weir, A
First Course in Mathematical Modeling. pg. 89].
Data collected to support combat modeling is especially susceptible to
measurement errors due to the nature of combat. Use of cover and concealment and
deception result in inaccuracies in measuring enemy losses. The tempo of battle
results in poor measurement and recording of friendly losses. Additionally,
environmental factors may preclude any measurement. Thus, combat data must be
viewed with skepticism. Because of the nature of this dirty data, the wartime analysts
Morse and Kimball argued for making changes in tactics only when at least a three
fold net increase (a hemibel difference) in performance could be anticipated [Morse
and Kimball, Methods of Operations Research. pg. 38].
The importance of data in model accuracy is highlighted by Lieberman in an
analysis of National Policy Modeling [Hughes, Militar Modeling pg. 252]. He holds
that discrepancies between model results are typically due to differences in input
data or assumptions.
L PROPER MODEL SELECTION
The final selection or generation of a model is governed by three simplified
principles:
1. Keep the decision maker and the decision to be made in perspective. Key
issues are timeliness and understandability.
2. Keep the model as simple as possible, yet sufficient in detail to adequately
reflect the environment being analyzed. According to Weir the model must
be reasonable, that is "does it agree with common sense?"
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3. The model must emulate the physical phenomena being analyzed. Personal
perceptions or biases introduced by either the client or the analyst will hinder
the model's validity.
1. REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. Define modeling and state its purpose.
2. Identify the fundamental uses of modeling.
3. Distinguish between the five different types of models and give an example
for each category.
4. Give several ways in which models can be used to support decision making.
5. Given that the ability of a model to communicate provides a measure of its
usefulness, explain why the model's transparency, flexibility, and
reproducibility can affect its value. Explain why its fidelity can hinder its
value.
6. Discuss the underlying importance of a model's credibility.
7. Compare and contrast the steps in an analysis as defined by Dorfman and
Weir.
8. Identify the three factors which affect a model's validity, the stage(s) in the
model development in which each is likely to occur, and measures which may
be taken to mitigate their effects.
9. Distinguish between an abstraction and an approximation. Determine when
they might be desirable.
10. What factors must be considered when determining a model's appropriateness
or suitability?
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IV. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS, PERFORMANCE, AND FORCE
EFFECTIVENESS (MOE/MOP/MOFE)
AIM:
Define MOP, MOE and MOFE. Ensure the student understands the
differences and similarities between variables and parameters in terms of equipment
characteristics (or capabilities), system performance, and operational (or
organizational) effectiveness.
OBJECTIVES:
* Define Measure Of Effectiveness (MOE), Measure Of Performance (MOP)
and Measure Of Force Effectiveness (MOFE)
Show how the use of MOEs are a logical consequence of modeling techniques
to efforts geared towards improving the effectiveness of combat operations
Show how the choice of MOE is dependent upon the phenomena being
modeled -- either as a one-sided, force-on-force or hunter-evader model
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* Examine analyses developed by Morse and Kimball during World War 11




* Equipment performance evaluation
READINGS:
1. Rockower, "Notes on Measures of Effectiveness", pp. 1-6.
2. Sweet, et. al, "Command and Control Evolution Workshop", pp. 2.4-2.8.
3. Morse and Kimball, Methods of Operations Research. Chapters 1,3.
4. Clayton Thomas, "MOE's ... Origins, Evolution, Roles", pp. 1-12.
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A. DEFINITION OF MOE/MOP/MOFE
Performance and effectiveness measurements provide a quantitative means of
determining the extent to which mission requirements are being met, the degree to
which a system is affecting the environment in which it is operating, or the impact
an operational decision is having upon combat outcomes. In order to support better
decision making Rockower [Rockower, "Notes on Measures of Effectiveness", pg. 2]
asserts that one must "establish a consistent, quantitative, measurable, and credible
measure ... of the value of alternative courses of action ..." These measures may
assess the value of the system in terms of design specifications, functional operation
or mission enhancement. According to Sweet [Sweet, et. al, "Command and Control
Evolution Workshop", pp. 2-6] these measures are:
1. Measures of Performance (MOP) -- function of the system's attributes;
2. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) - function of the system's performance
within the environment;
3. Measure of Force Effectiveness (MOFE) - function of system effectiveness
in a force structure.
B. IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS OF COMBAT OPERATIONS
Morse and Kimball asserted that, prior to World War IM tactics and strategy
were strongly influenced by environmental factors and little quantitative
measurement of decision variables was possible [Morse and Kimball, Mhods o
Qrations Research pg. 2]. They said that the principle purpose of operations
research is to analyze tactics, strategy and equipment and the operations in which
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these are applied. Prior to the organization of the Operations Research Group
(ORG) in April 1942 most scientific contributions to warfare advancement were in
terms of new "gadgets" vice better usage of current weapons [Morse and Kimball,
Methods of Operations Research pg. 1]. The ORG supported:
1. evaluation of new equipment, to include development of tactics to enhance
their employment;
2. evaluation of operations;
3. evaluation and analysis of tactical problems;
4. analysis of strategic planning;
5. provide research and development liaison.
According to Morse and Kimball the principal goal of OR is to improve the
efficiency (effectiveness) of current and future operations.
Clayton Thomas [Clayton THomas, "MOEs - Origins, Evolution, Roles]
identifies two principal uses for measures of effectiveness: as an indicator to enhance
understanding of an operation or improve its performance; or as an optimizer, used
to determine or select the best alternative. Thomas summarizes Omand Solandt's
account of the use of MOE's in World War II as a three stage process [Clayton
Thomas, "MOEs - Origins, Evolution, Roles", pg. 4]:
1. discover the purpose of the operations, i.e., describe it,
2. determine some means of measuring its effectiveness,
3. try to improve its effectiveness.
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C. DEPENDENCE UPON PHENOMENA BEING MODELED
To measure the effectiveness of an operation Morse and Kimball proposed the
use of MOE's for comparing the observed operations with theoretical outcomes,
friend versus foe, exchange rates, and operational results between different systems.
In striving to find the "constants of an operation" and determining how changes
to them affect operations, Morse and Kimball demonstrate their use of MOEs in
World War U analysis to be indicative in namre. Their goal was not to optimize
combat operations, but rather to improve the use of tactics and equipment.
The selection of an MOE/MOP/MOFE is critical to performing a valid
analysis of a system or operation. The choice of MOE is often determined by
examining the situation to be analyzed and the interaction of forces as either:
1. One-Side: measures changes to situation due to actions of only one side.
No response is considered by the opposing side. Most logistics (supply,
medicine, repair) is of this nature.
2. Force-on-Force: Players on both sides take actions affecting the situation to
be analyzed.
3. HntirEvd r: The aggressor player takes action to discover or destroy his
opponent, while the nonaggressor takes action simply to avoid detection.
Much of ASW is of this nature.
A special case of the hunter-evader activity is the predator-prey situation where
the hunter seeks the evader with the intent of capture or destruction. In this case the
prey (evader) has some means to fight back and inflict casualties on the hunter.
Thus this action has some of the characteristics of the force-on-force case.
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D. WORLD WAR II EXAMPLES
1. Sweep Rates
One of the first analyses examined by Morse and Kimball involved sweep
rates. They suggested measuring the effectiveness of area searches by comparing the
operational values observed to the theoretical values computed. The equations for
these values are given as [Morse and Kimball, Methods of Operations Research pg.
89]:
Q, = (C/N)(A/T) measured in square miles/hour
C = number of contacts
N = number of enemy in area
A = total area searched (sq miles)
T = total search time (hours)
(N/A) - the average density of enemy in the area (enemy/sq mile)
(C/T) = number of contacts observed per unit of search time
Qt=, 2 R V measured in square miles/hour
R - effective lateral range
V - average speed of aircraft
Note that (C/N) is the ratio of contacts made to the expected number of
contacts in the area. If (C/N) > 1 then some of the enemy were contacted more
than once. If (C/N) < 1 then some of the enemy were not contacted at all.
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By taking the ratio Q./Q,. a dimensionless factor results giving the net
effectiveness of the search activity:
=(CI)(A4I C 
Q 2RV 2RVNT
Sweep rates may be used when measuring one sided search activities or
hunter-evader activities where the evasion tactics of the non-aggressor serve to limit
the effectiveness of the aggressor's search. However, when the non-aggressor takes
action to destroy the aggressor then exchange rates should be considered rather then
sweep rates.
2. Exchange Rates
The use of exchange rates in combat analysis allows a consideration of
whether or not the calculated or expected losses incurred during a battle justify the
outcome [Morse and Kimball, Methods of Operations Research. pg. 45]. Assuming
similar equipment on both sides, the exchange rate is simply:
Exchange Rate = 1/k
1 number of enemy losses
k = number of friendly losses
The ratios of units lost to units engaged are:
(k/m) and (1/n)
m - number of friendly units engaged
n = number of enemy units engaged
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Factors affecting exchange rates which are not typically part of the
equation include the training and experience levels of the participants and the
equipment types included in the engagement.
When high value targets, such as merchant convoys, are being pursued by
aggressors, such as submarines, an important effectiveness measure is encounter and
engagement rates. However, when the high value targets are protected by active
friendly forces, the appropriate effectiveness measure becomes an exchange rate.
Morse and Kimball examined the practice of escorting merchant convoys as an
example of exchange rate measurements [Morse and Kimball, Methods of
p erations Resea, pg. 46].
3. Comparative Performance
Another use of MOE's examined by Morse and Kimball provided a means
of comparing the relative effectiveness of separate tactics or weapon systems. The
difficult task here as cited by Morse and Kimball is to determine a meaningful unit
of measurement. The analyst must be able to determine what phenomena are critical
and determine how these are affected by the various tactics or weapon systems being
analyzed. As examples of the method of comparative effectiveness Morse and
Kimball analyzed the impact of antiship weapons on ship design and bombing of
U-boat pens versus escorting convoys (whether the best use of aircraft in the
protection of merchant shipping is as ASW platforms, interdiction, or close air
support).
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4. Analyzing Equipment Performance
Finally, Morse and Kimball applied the MOE methodology to assess the
performance of a weapon system. Four factors were identified which are relevant to
measuring the effectiveness of a weapon system [Morse and Kimball, Methods of
Qerations Research, pg. 52]:
1. Cost - "Is the new weapon system worth obtaining and using at all?"
2. Employment - "When and where should the new system be used?"
3. Maintainability - "Is the new equipment easy to maintain in operation?"
4. Training - "How much and what kind of training is needed in order that the
new weapon be more effective than the old one?"
Morse and Kimball cited the use of anti-aircraft guns on merchant ships,
anti-torpedo nets, depth charge settings, and supervised practice as examples of
MOE's being used to assess equipment performance.
E. REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. Distinguish between a measure of performance, a measure of effectiveness,
and a measure of force effectiveness. As these measurements are not
mutually exclusive, give an example of a measurement which is both a
measure of effectiveness and a measure of performance.
2. Distinguish between a force-on-force model and a hunter-evader model. Give
an example of each. What is the impact on the model when an evader is able
to retaliate and inflict injury upon the hunter?
3. Justify the underlying purpose of the efforts of Morse and Kimball in World
War II analysis in that they attempted to improve tactics and operations and
not optimize combat operations.
4. Contrast the use of MOE's as indicators and optimizers.
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5. Compare the three stage process of MOE development with the methods of
model generation proposed by Weir, in section "F' of Chapter M.
6. Given that a scout plane has an average speed of 200 mph and can observe
objects at a distance of 10 miles, what is its theoretical sweep rate? If the
average density of enemy targets in the area of coverage is 0.0125 targets per
square mile and the historical records indicate that the operational sweep rate
is 65% of the theoretical, how many contacts can be expected in a 3 hour
search? If the scout plane's effectiveness increases to 95% with a 25%
reduction in speed, is the change warranted in terms of contacts made in a
three hour period? How many contacts would have to be made in a three
hour period to achieve an operational sweep rate of 100%? On what basis
might the observed sweep rate actually exceed the theoretical sweep rate?
7. One of the decisions studied by Morse and Kimball was whether to install
anti-aircraft guns on merchant ships. Identify two possible reasons for these
installations and the MOE associated with each reason. Analyze the
reasonableness of the installation in terms of the four factors given for
evaluating equipment performance.
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V. ATrRITION BASED MODELS
AIM:
Introduce the student to elementary force on force models. Introduce attrition
models which rely solely on casualty lates to determine outcome of battle. Provide
the students with attrition formulas as tools for early combat analysis. Provide the
student with examples to ensure an understanding of the equations.
OBJECTIVES:
* Show that attrition models are based on simultaneous infliction of casualties
Present the logic and conditions for Lanchester's laws
** The linear law equation
*** Discuss the concept and application of area fire
*** Discuss the alternative application - a series of duels
* The square law equation
*** Discuss the concept and application of aimed fire (concentration of
firepower)
*** Present Hughes' approximation to square law for engagements where
losses are < 15%
*** Introduce analysis of Iwo Jima and model validation
* The concept of mixed laws
S1
Discuss the application of mixed laws in modem combat
"Limitation of Lanchester Laws
Present law of exponential decay in combat
Discuss application of law - use example of Guadalcanal, and Napoleon's
march to Moscow
** Discuss Schneider's theory of exponential decay -- the significance of the
effectiveness coefficient
Provide the student with an opportunity to use laws in examples
Communicate the limitations and applicability of attrition models
* Discuss idea of movement/suppression/domination vs. attrition
* Discuss shock and mass and the need for treatment of "salvoes" or "pulses"
of combat power
Surprise is hard to model
READINGS:
1. Washburn, "Lanchester Systems", pp. 1-10.
2. Lindsay, "Lanchester Equations", pp. 1-23.
3. Schneider, Exponential Decay of Armies in Battle pp. 100-126.
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A. SIMULTANEOUS INFLICTION OF CASUALTIES
Early attempts at modeling the combat process used the attrition of forces as
a measurement of effectiveness to account for or predict battle outcomes. Attrition
modeling relates the rate of change of the number of forces on each side and
integrates these rate of change equations to provide a state equation which can be
used to determine the remaining number of forces on each side at any given time.
B. LANCHESTER LAWS
Frederick Lanchester derived two separate equations to account for battle
outcomes based upon attrition rates. Each of his two equations can in themselves
emulate two different combat situations. [Lindsay, "Lanchester Equations", pg. 1]
1. Linear Law [Washburn, "Lanchester Systems", pg. 9; Lindsay, "Lanchester
Equations", pp. 2-5]
This law models the effects of "ancient" hand-to-hand combat where a
battle was essentially a series of independent duels to the death between exactly two
combatants. As one combatant triumphed over one opponent another would take his
place until the succession of duels eventually left one side completely eliminated.
The second combat situation this law can be applied to is the exchange of fire
between forces where neither side can effectively target the other side. In effect,
each force is firing an "area fire" pattern in an effort to inflict casualties by the laws
of probability.
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The rate of change form of the area fire linear law is:
(1) *d - RBR dR=- aRB
dt dt
where: B = Blue force strength a. = Effectiveness of B
R = Red force strength a= Effectiveness of R
These rate equations yield the state equation of the linear law as
follows:
& - R, a B
where : B. R = initial force strengths
BP = force strength at time t
The final result of the battle can be predetermined by examng
the following ratios:
(2) > {=,>,<} a
If: "=" then outcome is a draw
">"then blue will eliminate red
"<"then red will eliminate blue
2. Square Law [Washburn, "Lanchester Systems', pp. 6-9]
When either side is able to concentrate his forces or fire upon the
opponent (when one-on-one combat no longer applies) or is able to effectively target
any and all of the other side, then the linear law no longer emulates the combat. In
this situation the ability of forces to provide "aimed fire" at the enemy becomes
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significant and a new equation must be employed to account for the improved fire
and infliction of casualties.
The name of the law is derived from the fact that the squares of the
fighting strengths appear in the state equation. The significance of the model is the
fact that the number of combatants engaged has greater influence on the outcome
of the battle than the attrition effectiveness of the combatants. The ability to aim
fire at the enemy results in a squaring effect of the number of forces fighting in a
battle.
The rate of change form of the square law is:
(3) d = - R ; dR = -BB
dt dt
where : B, R : represent force strength of (B)lue and (R)ed
B,. : attrition effectiveness coefficients of (B)lue and (R)ed
The rate equations yield the state equation of the square law:
(4) W = "R - W? 8
where : B., R, : represent initial force strengths
B,, R, : force strengths at time t
The final result of the battle can be predetermined by examining
the following ratios:
W {,> - <
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if: "=" then outcome is a draw
">"then blue will eliminate red
"<"then red will eliminate blue
3. Hughes' Approximation To The Square Law
While the Lanchester square law provides a straight forward means of
determining force strength and outcome in a battle of annihilation, the fact is
obscured that most of the square law advantages accrues to the winner towards the
end of the battle. From history we know that average land battle will be broken off
when casualties are about 10% and even in a major battle casualties seldom exceed
30%. For battles when casualties are less than 20%. a linear approximation of the
square law will serve. For equation (3) on page 55 we substitute:
(5) AB = -BAR ; AR = - 1B.
AT AT
where (AB/AT) and (AR/AT) are the Ise, Bo - Bt and Ro - Rt respectively, at
AT, the time the battle is over. A comparison of the calculated results with the
formal square law will demonstrate that the difference is negligible for most ground
battles.
The corresponding state equation is:
(6) &Ia = &&
R.-R, 8B.
where: B,, R, : are the survivors of Blue and Red at time (t).
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Simply stated, in the early stages of a battle in which aimed fire conditions
hold, the ratio of blue losses to red losses is the inverse of the ratio of the product
of their respective attrition coefficient and initial force strengths.
4. Mixed Laws [IUndsay, "Lanchester Equations, pg. 91
Deitchman [Lindsay, "Lanchester Equations", pg. 9] suggested the
combination of Lanchester's linear and square laws to model the outcome of a battle
where only one force is able to concentrate or aim its fire. Typical applications of
this type of mixed law include amphibious assaults, ambushes, and guerilla tactics.
The attrition equations for this law are:
(7) dR = - B.B (from the square law); and
dt
d = - RBR (from the linear law).
dt
The resulting state equation is:
(8) _-_ B- _Ro2-
Assuming that B is able to continue the aimed fire and R is unable to
seek cover or transition to aimed fire themselves, the outcome of the engagement
may be predicted by:
L>,<,=J.2




5. Limitation Of Lanchester's Laws
All of the Lanchester attrition equations presented have similar
limitations. The fundamental difference between the linear and square law
applications is the degree of control the commander is able to attain and maintain
over his troops and the situation. In his discussion of the effects of suppression
Schneider observes that "the square law ... assumes absolute and simultaneous
projection of force upon a target. In land warfare this projection is usually relative
and only simultaneous at the decision point." [Schneider, Exponential Decay of
Armies in Battle, pg. 88] This agrees with Hughes' assertion that combat is the
functional, temporal, and spatial application of force. Thus, the underlying
assumption of Lanchester's square law which requires the action of each combatant
to be controlled is frequently violated in actual combat. This failure of control results
in a breakdown not only in the targeting function, which causes a transition from
aimed (concentrated) fire to area (individual) fire, but also in the ability or
willingness of individual combatants to engage the enemy.
6. Solved Problems
Glenn F. Lindsay's article "Lanchester Equations" presents several
exercises for understanding the Lanchester equations. Three of the problems are




Given: Initial Red Force strength, 100.
Initial Blue Force strength, 120.
Red and Blue use aimed fire with kill rate 0.1 and 0.08, respectively.
A. Determine the expected winner of a fight to the end.
B / 2W - 14400/10000 = 1.44
BI] 8, - 0.1/0.08 = 1.25
Thus, B./R 2 > B./B,, which implies Blue wins.
B. Determine the final strength of the winner.
Bo2 - Be = , thus 14400 - B =. J. Therefore,
Ro2 - Rt2  B 10000-0 0.08
B,2 = 14400 - 10000(1.25) = 1900. Hence, Blue survives with 43.58 troops left.
Note that this shows one of the limitations of the Lanchester model, in that it
models a continuous loss curve as opposed to a discrete steploss curve.
C. Determine how many elements Red would have needed to achieve a victory.
For Red to win requires W_ < &. Thus, 14M < 0,.L.
Rt J4 PR2 0.08




Given: Red Force ambushes Green; Red uses aimed fire, Green responds with area
fire.
Initial Green strength, 150 men: Red, 25 men.
Red firing rate is 40 shots per minute, with a single shot kill probability of 0.2.
Red is dispersed over 1000 square feet.
Area of each Red troop exposed, 0.2 square feet.
Green's probability of a kill against Red given a hit is 0.5.
Implies:Red attrition coefficient is (40)(0.2) = 8.
A. Find the critical value for Green's rate of fire. That is, at what rate of fire by
Green does the outcome of the battle change?
For parity, ,. = .&_. Thus, 3. = 16(25)/22500.
Go 2aR
But, B = (rate fire.)(exp area)((kill given hit,,)).
(Red dispersal area)
Hence, the Green rate of fire is:
16(25)(1000)/(.2)(.5)(22500) = 177.8.
Therefore, if Green maintains a firing rate of 178 shots per minute Green will
win. If Green's firing rate drops to 177 then Red will win.
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B. Determine the effect of changes to Green's rate of fire on Red's residual
strength. (Assume Red victory)
R, =R- LW.. Thus, R, = 25- rate21)(5(22500).
2 a. 2(8)(1000)
This equation is dnear with respect to R, and rate0.
PROBLEM 4:
Given: Combatants in wagon train - 50 men. Indian combatants - 100 men.
Probability of a hit by wagon train members is three times that of the indians.
Firing rates are equal for both sides.
Help arrives for the wagon train when wagon train men are reduces to 25.
Arriving cavalry forces have the same rate of fire and hit probability as the
indians.
A. How many cavalry men need to be sent to defeat the Indians if the cavalry
arrives when there are only 25 wagon train members left?
(3U -M) = j6,; (5=(V - L2) B, o00 - 0,
Solving for I, gives the number of Indians remaining to be 66, so the number
of cavalry men needed will be 67 (assuming the rate of fire and accuracy is the
same for the cavalry as it is for the Indians).
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B. If only 60 cavalry men are sent to assist the wagon train will there be any
survivors of the wagon train party when all battles are completed?
Assuming the Indians focus their attention to the cavalry first then the number
of Indians remaining after the cavalry is defeated is determined by:
(66*66 - 13 = 1 ; so I, = 28 Indians remaining.
(60"60- 0) 1
Using Lanchester equations to solve for the winner in a battle between 28
Indians and 25 people in the wagon train gives:
(2525) L.1 ; since 0.7972 > 0.333 the wagon train will win.
(28*28) 3
The number of wagon train survivors is determined by:
(225 = 1 ; solving for W, gives 19 wagon train survivors.
(28*28- 0) 3
The incremental nature of this problem highlights the difference between the
actual dis,-Tete nature of attrition and the continuous nature of the Lanchester
model. While round off error is small at each step, it could become significant
for larger scale models based upon Lanchester attrition algorithms.
C. EXPONENTIAL DECAY
When control of targeting diminishes the probability that a given target
receives more than one fatal or disabling hit increases and the net effectiveness of
the fire decreases. As command, leadership, and control over individual shooters
diminishes, the ratio of active elements to inactive elements also declines. Those
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elements not providing fire then become "passive targets". In studying the works of
BGen S.LA. Marshall, Schneider concluded that only 15-25% of a unit would fire
their weapons and then not all of those would fire them with any constancy or
control [Schneider, Exponential Decay of Armies in Battle. pp. 100-107]. He further
concluded that when the limitations imposed upon combat operations by imperfect
command and control and inactive shooters are taken into account, the linear law
should be modified by dropping the factor reflecting the number of enemy shooters
[Schneider, Exponential Decay of Armies in Battle. pp. 108-114]. The resulting rate
of change equations then become:
= -6RB,
dt
dR = -63R .
dt
These equations imply that the loss of force is proportional to the size of the
force. Thus, while Lanchester holds that superior numbers result in superior results,
this model implies that a large force can expect greater losses than a small force.
When integrating these rate equations the resulting state equations become:
B, = Boexp[-53t], and
R, = Rexp[-53t].
We do tot have space to develop all of Schneider's rationale for this very
counter-intuitive conclusion. Note the following, however. First, Schneider's
development is for ground combat. Second, the basis of his conclusion is the
empirical evidence -- combat data. He goes on to offer explanations for this strange
data, but his theorizing [Schneider, Exponential Decay of Armies in Battle, pp. 108-
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126] is, unlike Lanchester, solely for the purpose of explaining what historians have
observed in practice. Third, it should be remembered that the firing side is
represented by the attrition coefficient, 6, that treating the coefficient as a constant
is only an approximation since the firing side's fire will diminish as it suffers loss,
and that the better trained, motivated, and more numerous force will have the bigger
attrition coefficient. We may summarize by saying the exponential law asserts that
losses to side R at any time during the battle will be directly proportional to the fire
effectiveness of side B and to the number of R remaining at that time.
D. THE OPERATIONAL ART CONNECTION
This chapter is about combat rather than operations, but before concluding
passing mention should be made of another application of the exponential law. In
a campaign of many weeks, losses from sickness have frequently exceeded losses
from enemy action. Examples of this are the French losses in Napoleon's invasion
of Russia and march to Moscow in 1812, and the US and Japanese losses in the
campaign for Guadalcanal from August 1942 to January 1943. In these instances the
form of the loss equations is again exponential, but the coefficients will be the
coefficients representing the rate of incidence of sickness of one's own forces, and
similarly for the breakdown rate of tanks, aircraft, and other vehicles.
E. THE COMMAND AND CONTROL CONNECTION
The fundamental difference between battles following the square law and those
following the exponential law is the degree of control maintained by the commander
over the situation. The closer command comes to bringing all its forces into action
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without massing them so that they are easily targeted, and the closer it comes to the
ideal distribution of fire so that each shooter aims at a different live and threatening
target, the closer it comes to square law performance. According to Schneider, "In
land warfare Lanchester's square law is not the reality, it is the ideal; but an ideal
that must always be striven for ... [which] is, at the heart, the spark of military
genius" [Schneider, Eponential Decay of Armies in Battle, pg. 57].
To the extent that a command and control system enables the commander to
control the actions of his forces in combat and achieve square law effects, the system
may be seen as a force multiplier. Where both forces have efficient command and
control, the square law favors the side with superior numbers. Where both have
inferior command and control, the linear law favors the force with better individual
performance.
F. LIMITATIONS OF ATI'RITION MODELS
While the attrition based models discussed provide insight into the effects of
men in battle upon force strength they provide less insight into the actual processes
of combat tnd the effects of combat upon those involved. The ability to achieve the
square law effects is limited by terrain, in the case of land warfare, and by the
commander's ability to maintain control over his engaged forces. Two of the most
prominent factors affecting his ability to control his forces are friction and
suppression.
Friction, as identified by Carl von Clausewitz, is the net effect of environmental
conditions beyond the direct control of either force which when taken together
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degrade the overall effectiveness of combat forces. One of the main sources of
friction in ground combat is terrain. Schneider associates three principal effects of
terrain with the failure to achieve decisive concentration (and by corollary, aimed
fire effects): (1) degradation of attrition rates, due to reduced target size; (2)
impedance to movement, which limits the optimum positioning of troops; and (3)
hinderance to deployment, which limits the ability to bring all forces into combat
[Schneider, Expmnential Decay of Armies in Battle. pg. 55].
While the effects of friction may be felt without overt action by either force,
suppression requires concentrated effort in order to achieve or mitigate its impact
on operations. The goal of suppression is to inhibit the enemy's ability or desire to
move or return fire. The effect is failure to concentrate or perform target selection
and allocation, which breaks down the square law effect. According to Schneider,
concentration "is the effective temporal and spatial ... projection of ... force ... at the
decisive time and point" [Schneider, Exponential Decay of Armies in Battle pg. 38].
By employing well coordinated suppressive fire, the commander attempts to inhibit
the enemy's ability to reach the effective concentration point in time or space.
1. Intelligence, Deception, And Maneuver
Effective firepower requires the allocation of the proper weapon or force
composition for a given objective; thus, concentration is the result of applying the
right force at the right time at the right place. To reduce an opponent's ability to
concentrate his combat power a commander must apply his force in such a way as
to frustrate the opponent's attempts to mass his firepower at the decisive place and
time. This may be done in various ways, two of which are deception and scouting.
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Deception attempts to mask the position of one's forces, or confuse the enemy
regarding one's intentions. The net effect is to cause doubt as to the actual decisive
point. Scouting, on the other hand, attempts to locate the point at which the enemy
should be struck.
Critical to massing one's forces is maneuverability. Freedom of movement
on the battlefield is essential to achieving and maintaining concentration.
Furthermore, denying the opponent freedom of movement is essential to achieving
square law effects. The square law assumes constant and continuous attrition. This
is only achieved when the enemy is fixed in place.
2. Pulsed Firepower And Surprise
The continuous nature of fire in the square law is incongruous with the
nature of much of modem naval warfare. As will be shown in the next chapter, the
trend toward aircraft carrier based forces and the use of stand-off missiles has led
to a pulsed attrition, where the combat power of a force is delivered in discrete
pulses or waves. Here the effects of combat must be measured after the delivery of
each pulse rather than the continuous relative attrition modeled by Lanchester
methods.
Finally, one factor not yet discussed which greatly impacts the results is
surprise, especially so when the firepower arrives in pulses. While its effect on




The following points should be understood as a summary of the attrition
modeling techniques developed in this chapter:
1. The model form will vary according to the physical characteristics of the
battles. There is no general model, and the analyst must apply the form that
fits the conditions.
2. Insight into the C2 contributions may be seen by t'-- way combat power is
increased through coordinated (square law form) versus uncoordinated
activities (linear or exponential laws).
H. REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. Differentiate between the classical Lanchester square law and the Hughes'
approximation to the square law. Which formula is more "technically" correct?
What purpose or usefulness does the other equation provide?
2. What are the assumed conditions for the linear and square laws? What must
be done if the assumptions are violated?
3. Given that an individual (blue) shooter can fire at a rate of 5 rounds per
minute, each opponent (grey) provides a target area of 0.165 square feet (6
in x 4 in), and the field of fire is 30,000 sq ft (100 yds deep, 100 ft wide),
calculate the individual effectiveness coefficient for the blue shooters if the
field contains 50 enemy troops assuming that the enemy is providing sufficient
suppressive fire to cause the shooters to only fire at random.
4. Given that each blue shooter in the above question presents a 0.33 square
foot target to the opponent, and that each opponent is capable of placing his
round in a 1 sq ft area at the same rate determine the single shot hit
probability for the grey shooters. If the probability of a kill given a hit is 0.5
then determine the overall effectiveness coefficient for a typical grey shooter.
5. For problem 3, determine the initial blue troop level necessary to ensure a
blue victory (at least one blue troop remaining) in a fight to the death. Is
it reasonable to assume that blue would continue the fight under these
circumstances (Why or why not)?
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6. Given that blue has less than the minimum number of troops necessary as
determined by problem 4, provide three measures which blue may take to
increase his likelihood of a favorable outcome.
7. Assuming that blue is able to transition to aimed fire, has 100 troops
remaining at the time of transition, each with the same rate of fire and
probability of kill given a hit as a typical grey troop, use Hughes'
approximation to determine the resulting troop strengths, given grey has only
40 troops remaining when the transition occurs and is willing to lose only 4
more men.
8. According to the linear and square laws, the effect of doubling one side's
effectiveness coefficient is to double the rate of losses incurred by the other.
Determine the effect of doubling the effectiveness coefficient on the
exponential decay model. Which factor then has more significance in the
final troop strength, initial troop level or the opponent's effectiveness?
9. Why should the goal of a force commander in combat be to achieve square
law effects?
10. Why does it make sense to think of a command and control system as
resulting in a force "diminisher" vice multiplier?
11. Discuss methods which a commander may take to limit the ability of his
opponent to achieve square law effects.
12. Explain why force cohesion is important in battle. In your opinion, what was
the benefit of drum and fife corps in battle.
13. Why is it important for shooters to return fire when pinned down?
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VI. NAVY BATTLE MODELING
AIM:
Review history to show that while force against force and attrition have been
dominant in the nature of naval combat, its manifestation, and therefore the
appropriate model of sea combat, has changed during four periods. The Lanchester
(continuous fire) model has to be replaced in modem combat with a pulsed power
model of naval combat. Emphasize the evolution of models into tactical decision
aids.
OBJECTIVES:
* Present the cornerstones of maritime warfare
* Distinguish the great trends and constants of naval combat
Discuss the functions (processes) of naval combat -- shooting, scouting, C2 and
their antitheses
Look at the evolution of naval combat and effect on C2 in terms of modeling
of various force-on-force engagements:
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The age of the fighting sail and the smooth bore gun (continuous fire
between ships)
* The age of steam and rifled gun (continuous fire between fleets)
The age of aircraft carriers (pulsed firepower)
The missile age
*** Review the modem naval force-on-force model in terms of missile
attack and defense
Emphasize that models of naval combat are attrition-based
* "Scouting" must be included for complete understanding of C2
Examine the increasing role of tactical decision aids as used by the Navy
READINGS:
1. Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice.
2. Wayne P. Hughes, "Naval Pulsed Firepower Combat Model".
3. Frank M. Snyder, Command and Control: Readings and Commentary.
"Session 4 - Operational Decisions: Decision Aids", pp. 45-55.
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A. BACKGROUND
• At this point the reader must recognize that the laws presented by Lanchester
are simply tools which must be correctly chosen and applied to create a useful
combat model. The limitations of the laws discussed in the previous chapter indicate
that there must be other tools to simulate the environments and situations not
covered by the Lanchester laws. Effective combat modeling involves more than a
simple understanding of mathematical formulas and their applications. The formulas
presented up to this point are a collection of some of the tools required for creating
useful combat models.
By examining naval combat the reader will be able to see how some basic
formulas can be applied to understand past naval warfare and to develop models for
the future. In order to create useful combat models it is necessary to have a
collection of tools other than just mathematical equations at your disposal. These
other "tools" include such items as: understanding the historical application of force
in the type of warfare being analyzed (naval warfare in this case), and an
understanding of the trends and constants which recur in this environment. In his
book Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, Capt. Hughes (USN Ret.) addresses the
historical perspective of naval combat and the "tools" that a combat modeler must
be familiar with in order to understand the nature of naval warfare. This chapter
discusses the aspects of naval combat from Fleet Tactics which show the trend of
combat analysis from the application of formulas to battles through World War II
to the complexity of decision aids currently used in the Navy.
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B. CORNERSTONES OF MARITIME WARFARE
In understanding the history of naval warfare Capt. Hughes outlines the five
cornerstones of naval combat which must be kept in view at all times [Wayne
Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice. Chapter 1]:
1. Men matter most;
2. Doctrine is the glue of tactics;
3. To know tactics, know technology;
4. The seat of purpose is on the land;
5. Attack effectively first.
The cornerstones of naval combat must be kept in mind to appreciate the trends and
constants which have a significant effect on the history of naval combat.
C. PROCESSES OF NAVAL COMBAT
In order to put to use the trends and constants which make up naval warfare,
it is necessary to understand that combat is a collection of processes which occur
simultaneously. For combat on the seas the processes can be reduced to delivery of
firepower, counterforce activity, scouting and antiscouting. The concerted effects of
these processes are directed by the commander by a C2 process and opposed by C2
countermeasures. The result is delivered combat power.
The trends and constants of naval combat provide a basis in tactics and
principles which underlie naval engagements. By studying these characteristics of
combat a modeler will be able to understand the processes of naval combat. The
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processes which are fundamental to naval combat are [Wayne Hughes, IleTactics
Theory %tnd PLactice, pp. 145-146]:
1. Attrition. Naval combat is an attrition process which results from the
effective delivery of firepower.
2. Scouting. The ability to strike effectively first is a direct result of the scouting
process.
3. C2. The conversion of potential into combat power is the process of
command and control.
The processes of shooting, scouting and (2 have antitheses. These are
employed by a commander in the protection of his forces. The activities are designed
to reduce the enemy's ability to deliver effective firepower, his scouting effectiveness
and C2 ability. These functions are called counterforce, antiscouting, and C2
countermeasures (C2CM). The purpose of counterforce is to reduce the effect of
enemy firepower by defensive fire, protective armor, damage control and other such
means. Antiscouting uses whatever means available to disrupt enemy scouts and
delay detection or tracking, in order to allow the advantage of the first strike to
friendly forces. C2CM activities are those associated with disrupting the enemy's
ability to decide, disseminate battlefield information, and deliver orders to his own
forces.
D. GREAT TRENDS AND CONSTANTS OF NAVAL COMBAT
In order for a modeler to develop good models for predictions he must
understand the trends of the environment being modeled. The trends in naval
warfare must be acknowledged in any model which attempts to emulate naval
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warfare to be true to the nature of combat at sea. Several of the key trends
identified by Capt. Hughes which have affected the process of naval combat are
[Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice pg. 196]:
1. Shift of emphasis from speed of platform to speed of weapon.
2. Scouting has replaced the importance of ship maneuverability.
3. The range of weapons has increased significantly.
4. The lethality of weapons has increased significantly.
5. Counterforce (cover, deception, dispersion, etc.) has replaced the notion of
a more survivable posture through armor, sheer size, better damage control,
etc.
6. Not only has the function of scouting gained in importance, but the rate and
range of scouting and surveillance has increased significantly.
7. To circumvent the increase in effectiveness and range of weapons,
antiscouting has played a large role to keep forces undetected for as long as
possible.
The constants which must be accounted for in a model must be understood and
enforced in a manner similar to the trends. Several of the key constants of naval
warfare are [Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice, pg. 197]:
1. Purpose of maneuver is to create an advantage in position relative to the
enemy.
2. The ability to fire effectively first is the primary tactical goal.
3. The application of pulsed power may result in a victory for an inferior force.
4. Defense plays a smaller role in naval combat than in land combat.
5. There is never enough scouting capacity or information.
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6. Commanders must be prepared to reallocate resources to improve scouting
or surveillance even at the expense of firepower.
E. EVOLUTION OF NAVAL TACTICS
The history of naval combat has developed through several notable periods of
evolution in both tactics employed and technology available. The periods of interest
include: the age of the fighting sail and the smooth bore gun, the age of steam and
rifled guns, the age of the aircraft carriers, and the missile age. By examining each
of these periods the reader will gain an understanding of the utility of attrition-based
models and also the limitations of applying a simple kind of an attrition model to
all cases.
1. Age Of The Fighting Sail [Hughes, Fleet Tactic, Chapter 2]
The age of the fighting sail saw the earliest examples of the constants of
naval combat. Among the constants identifiable during this period include: the
noticeable effect of concentration of firepower, and the advantage of C2 to control
and maneuver fleets effectively. Concentration of firepower was achieved in this
period by two basic means. The first means of concentrating firepower was to put
more guns on a ship by producing double and triple deck ships to fight in the line.
A ship's gunfire could be concentrated against another, so that the conditions for the
square law held vice the linear law. The second means involved the fighting line of
ships which allowed a commander to bring all of his ships together to form a
concerted effort in battle. But because effective range of the guns was short, duels
between individual ships resulted, and so the linear law's conditions held. The
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command of ships was simplified by the fighting line by placing the flagship in the
middle of the line so that message flags could be quickly displayed to all the ships
in the line.
2. Age Of Steam And Rifled Gun (Hughes, Fl acic Chapter 31
The age of steam propulsion and the rifled gun was marked by
technological advances in fabrication of steel and weapons. One of the biggest trends
highlighting this period was the use of steel and other armor materials to build ships.
The stronger, armor protected ships could take more direct hits and still be a strong
adversary. In addition to being stronger the increase in maneuverability provided by
steam plants allowed the commander new possibilities in formation and strategies.
Ships were now free from dependence on the wind, and the tacticians of the time
were in disagreement as to how best to use these ships in naval combats, some
favoring their use as rams to swiftly destroy an unsuspecting line of ships.
Another extremely important trend followed in this period was a marked
increase in the range and lethality of weapons brought on by rifled guns. The range
of effective weapons was drastically increased from 300-500 yards to 8-10 miles. The
increased range of weapons gave fleet commanders a new possibility for
concentrating force. These new weapons allowed the commander to concentrate
firepower of any and all of his ships against any ship in a concentrated enemy
formation, and so square law conditions held between whole fleets. This
concentration was brought out and enforced by the reemergence of the battle line
[Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice pg. 67]. Crossing the enemy's
T' was seen as the tactical goal of every fleet. The importance of being able to
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quickly form a single battleline out of several columns (employed for cruising)
emphasized the need for more scouting and reconnaissance information.
The wireless radio and extensive signal codes developed during this period
altered the command and control aspects of naval combat. The flagship no longer
had to be placed in the center of the formation and the scouting and reconnaissance
ships could be placed well out of sight of the main formation yet communicate by
radio.
3. Age Of Aircraft Carriers [Hughes, e Tactic, Chapter 5]
The age of steam and the rifled gun gave way after WW I to the age of
aircraft carriers. The effect that naval air power has had on naval combat in terms
of trends, tactics and strategy is rivaled only by the effects the missile has had on
modem naval combat scenarios. The ability to launch aircraft from carriers and
attack at ranges 10 times greater than guns had decisive effects on the sea battles
of WW I.
Aircraft squadrons provided the naval forces with two major
improvements over the age of steam. The first improvement involved the range of
scouting and reconnaissance efforts. Aircraft provided a longer range for scouting
efforts which improved dramatically the chances of making the first strike. The
second improvement involved the concentration of firepower an air wing in time.
The result was a in "pulsed firepower" battle. In his paper "Naval Pulsed Firepower
Combat Model", Capt. Hughes provides a model to reflect the outcome of these
pulsed fire engagements which are a result of the aircraft carrier air wings.
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This age of naval combat provides an excellent opportunity to apply
attrition modeling to actual engagements observed during WW U. In FetI.Tacic,
Capt. Hughes applied a simple tactical model of carrier warfare to demonstrate how
the notion of attrition models and the pulsed firepower concept can be combined to
model the carrier engagements in the Pacific [Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory
and ractice pp. 93-103]. This model fitted the historic battle outcomes and showed
that the Lanchester continuous fire model was obsolete.
One of the most important of the trends observed in this period was the
technological breakthroughs in sensory equipment. With the capability to conduct
large air strikes hundreds of miles away from the carrier the need for longer range
sensory information is obvious. In order to be victorious in a sea battle the force
commander knew it was essential that he strike first. The technological revolution
in radar, ESM, jamming, and air defense communications all coordinated in a
combat information center (CIG) were paramount in the success the US forces had
in naval battles [Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practie, Chapter 5].
4. Age Of Missiles
The increases in range and lethality of weapons which occurred during the
age of the aircraft carriers have undergone yet another transition in the current age
of land and sea based missile. The trend of developing longer reaching weapons and
the development of long range tactical and strategic missiles has had significant
impact on the tactics considered for use in naval combat scenarios. Inclusive with the
range and lethality of these new missiles are: a potential to concentrate firepower
from widely separated ships and aircraft, a need for better scouting and
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reconnaissance equipment and strategies -- including the roles of decreasing the
enemy's ability to scout effectively, and the need for a more coordinated C2 system
to deal with an environment to enhance friendly force's capabilities while stifling the
enemy's ability to perform well - C2CM. [See Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics Theoy
and Practice Chapter 10, for a development of a model which takes into account the
current capabilities of long range missiles and the ability of forces to scout and
perform C2CM functions to enhance the probabilities of a first strike.]
The age of missiles has brought about another concentration of firepower
unique to nuclear missiles. The advent of multiple warhead nuclear missiles puts a
high concentration of firepower on one weapon. The destructive capability of a
single weapon now exceeds that of many third world fleets around the world. This
concentration of firepower allows for multiple targeting of a site with only one vessel
being designated as the shooter and the other vessels waiting in reserve.
F. FUNCTION OF SCOUTING
The function of scouting has been a recurring issue in naval combat from the
earliest age of the sail ship to the modem age of missile warfare. The need to know
not only where the enemy is and what his capabilities are have been shown to turn
many battles into local victory for the inferior fleet. The importance of scouting in
naval tactics provides a dilemma for the current force commander. On the one hand,
scouting provides obvious benefits in the advantage given to the force which conducts
the most effective scouting. On the other hand, scouting reduces the number of
forces wh:eh can be drawn upon for firepower while the scouts are engaged in
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scouting and reconnaissance. The tradeoff between ready firepower and forces
engaged in search and tracking must be carefully weighed by the force commander
(and combat modeler) to determine an optimum balance.
G. TACTICAL DECISION AIDS
With the complexities of such problems as scouting needs versus firepower
reserves, and choice of weapons for specific targets in a modern conflict the need
for and use of tactical decision aids has risen dramatically. The most significant
origin of decision aiding began in WW II as operational analysis work was being
conducted to help commanders make better tactical decisions and force employment
techniques [Frank M. Snyder, Command and Control: Readings and Commentary.
pg. 49]. The development of these decision aids is directly related to being able to
follow the trends and constants of naval combat and the ability to apply the proper
modeling parameters to the situation.
H. REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. List the five cornerstones of maritime warfare as defined by Hughes and
describe how each affects command and control.
2. Describe the functions that result in delivery of combat power at sea. Contrast
these with the processes involved in naval combat.
3. Describe the evolution of combat power at sea, in terms of changes in
weapon range and lethality. What is the effect on choice of model of naval
combat at different periods of history?
4. Assess the impact of changes in weapon delivery on the importance of the
maneuverability of the platform.
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5. Why is it so important in naval warfare to attack effectively first? How can
this capability be maintained in peacetime by a country whose foreign policy
denounces a first strike capability?
6. How have advances in communications technologies affected naval command
and control?
7. Given the following:
A. = 12, a4 = 0.5, a2 = 2, a = 2, a, = 0.5
B. = 8,b, = 0.5, b 2 =2,13 =4, . =0.5
a) Use the Naval Pulsed Firepower Combat Model to compute the number
of survivors, A, and B,, for a single exchange of salvoes.
b) Side A determines that if he can cut his defensive firepower in half (a1 =
0.25) he will double his offensive targeting accuracy (a = 1.0). What effect
will this have on A, and B, (assuming all other values remain constant)?
8. How has the development of stand-off missiles impacted the development of
naval tactics? How does this affect the modeler and the modeling process?
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VII. NON-ATRITION BASED MODELS
AIM:
Introduce the students to the idea that strict attrition models are not adequate
in explaining the outcomes of battles. Explain how an advantageous position and
maneuverability play important roles in determining the outcome of a battle in
addition to the commanders' interpretation of the situation. Discuss the idea of
break points and examine their use in current modeling practices. Examine some of
the non-attrition modeling techniques in use.
OBJECTIVES:
* Present idea of mission accomplishment being measured in terms other
than attrition, such as domination of the enemy (or control of the situation to
one's own ends)
* Examine the role of suppression as a measure of dominance
Discuss McQuie's article on break points
** Introduce breakpoint phenomenon
' How break points are established
e Examine the trends of dominance of maneuver over attrition
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** Discuss the problem of battlefield impressions vice measuring actual losses
during combat
** Emphasize that a typical engagement results in a withdrawal of forces vice
a fight to the death
Discuss methods of estimating combat potential and power
* Use of fire power indices
*88 The basic form of the relationships and the applications
888 The limitations of fire power indices
88 The QJM approach to nonattrition models
888 The basic form of the relationship and the applications
The limitations of QJM
8888 The dimensional incompatibility of model
***8 Power distribution and tactics
Present a model of nuclear arms race as an example of graphical modeling
techniques
88 The application of the model
88 The limitations of model
Discuss the Soviet Correlation of Forces and Means (COFM) model as an
extreme use of decision aids using nonattrition models
88 The basic form of model
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The limitation of the model
Review application of models to the air-land battle
Present modeling of techniques at different levels - unit, division/corps,
theater and global
READINGS:
1. Robert McQuie, "Battle Outcomes: Casualty Rates as a Measure of Defeat".
2. T.N. Dupuy, Understanding War History and Theory of Combat, pp. 81-89.
3. T.N. Dupuy, Understanding War History and Theory of Combat pp. 39-50.
4. Giordano and Wier, A First Course in Mathematical Modeling pp. 4-14.
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A. MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT
At this point the reader should begin to recognize a common problem with all
the attrition models looked at thus far. Typically, the final outcome was determined
by a battle to the end where one side loses most or all of his forces. In reality this
situation rarely happens.
In order to understand the need for non-attrition models it is necessary to look
at how a commander would answer the following questions: "How many losses am
I willing to suffer before conceding my aim (mission) to the enemy?", and "What
other factors influence my decision to retreat or surrender?". What casualty total is
sufficient to cause the commander to admit defeat? Is the number as high as 50%,
or is it closer to 10%? Can this number be predicted, or is it dependent upon the
commander, his mission, and the particular engagement?
What are the factors which may affect the commander's decision to admit
defeat, and how can these factors be modeled for analysis? Several possibilities for
these factors include: domination -- if a commander feels that he is outmatched in
the battle he may retreat early; maneuver -- if one sides forces have become
surrounded and are incapable of maneuvering towards their objective they may
surrender; and the environment itself -- a commander whose forces are battling in
an unfamiliar environment may not feel as comfortable with a high casualty rate and
may retreat earlier than expected.
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the models and techniques
for accounting for some of the other factors which strongly influence combat
outcomes in the real world.
B. SUPPRESSION
In his book, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat. Dupuy
addresses the importance of suppression in determining the outcome of battles. He
defined suppression as "the degradation of hostile operational capabilities through
the employment of military action that has psychological and/or physical effects
[which] temporarily [impair] the combat performance of enemy forces and personnel
who have not themselves been killed or wounded." [Dupuy, Understanding War
History and Theory of Combat pg. 252] As discussed earlier, the use of suppression
limits a force's ability to achieve the hyperbolic attrition effects predicted by
Lanchester's Square Law.
The effects of suppression were readily addressed by Marshall [Schneider, 'he
Exponential Decay of Armies in Battle", pg. 104] when he observed that, under the
influence of enemy fire, soldiers would neglect the training and doctrine which was
taught to them, calling for return of fire, to force the enemy to also go to ground.
Schneider's account of the Battle of Gettysburg [Schneider, "The Exponential Decay
of Armies in Battle", pg. 97] graphically depicts the effect of terror, induced by
suppression, on battlefield discipline. According to Schneider many of the weapons
recovered after the battle showed multiple loads, to the point of becoming a
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potential pipebomb, and improperly loaded weapons, essentially useless. Here the
effect of suppression effectively removed many soldiers from the battle.
Dupuy goes on to say that the amount of suppression generated is a function
of the explosive power of the munitions employed, the number of rounds fired, and
the rate at which the fire is delivered. Additionally, the period of time that the
suppressive fire is delivered will impact upon its effectiveness: the longer the fire is
delivered the greater the cumulative effect.
Dupuy notes that the effects of suppressive fire are blatantly left out of both
wargaming and field exercise. However, he contends that it is essential that U.S.
personnel be exposed to the reality of suppression and its impact on the battlefield.
Thus, while the effects of suppression are difficult to quantify, they can provide
a means of measuring the ability of a commander to control his forces, and
therefore, become a surrogate for dominance. Marshall's analysis revealed that
forces held down by suppressive fire for just a couple of days became morally
broken, and attempts to continue the engagement were futile [Schneider, The
Exponential Decay of Armies in Battle", pg. 104]. Thus by employing suppression
a force could dominate the battlefield and frustrate the enemy's objective.
C. BREAKPOINTS
Robert McQuie's article, "Battle Outcomes: Casualty Rates As a Measure of
Defeat" [ARMX Nov 1987] examines the relationship between casualty rates in
modem warfare and conflicts and battle outcomes. McQuie refers to the moment
when a force commander accepts that the battle is lost as the breakpoint. In his
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analysis of data accumulated by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization
(HERO), McQuie attempted to find a cause-and-effect relationship for battle
outcomes.
McQuie found that on the average, defenders were willing to accept a casualty
ratio with respect to initial force strength that was twice as great as an attacker's
before admitting defeat. Nonetheless, he found that the median casualty levels for
defenders and attackers were only eight and four percent, respectively, far less than
tc- levels normally used for combat simulations to determine breakpoints.
Exchanges ratios experienced prior to breakpoints followed the same general pattern:
defenders were willing to accept losses at a rate approximately two and a half times
as great as attackers.
But McQuie also concluded that neither the number of casualties experienced
in battle nor the rate at which they were experienced was a driving factor in the
outcome of the battle. According to McQuie, more significant to the outcome of the
battles were the ability of the enemy to maneuver, the withdrawal of adjacent
friendly forces and a commander's perception of near-term developments. These
three factors may have a high degree of correlation, in that as a commander
recognizes the ability of the enemy to envelop his forces or his inability to effectively
position his forces he may sense the futility of continuing the exchange. This is
compatible with Marshall's finding that once the thrust of an attack is broken and
the attackers are forced to go to the ground it is very unlikely that the impetus can
be restored [Schneider, "The Exponential Decay of Armies in Battle", pp. 104-105].
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Thus, McQuie holds that commanders seldom commit their forces to a suicidal
situation.
As pointed out by Morse and Kimball, the data available to the commander
is often tainted (dirty). It may reflect inaccuracies induced by the heat of battle and
overestimation of both casualties sustained by friendly forces and casualties inflicted
upon the enemy. Regardless of the source of the inaccuracies, the perception in the
mind of the decision maker is the basis of the decision and causes him to withdraw
from a battle he can win or continue when the battle is beyond redemption. McQuie
holds that, in battle, commanders are "prudent and cautious" with respect to
continuing an engagement which appears to be unwinnable. Thus, misperceptions
may contribute to acceptance of defeat and lead to false conclusions as to the
importance of casualties in determining battle outcomes.
McQuie concludes with the observation that most battles are decided by factors
other than casualties. Further, he found that the majority of engagements were
terminated with less than a ten percent casualty level. Clearly, except in extreme
cases, a fight to the death is atypical for land combat.
D. METHODS OF ESTIMATING COMBAT POTENTIAL
1. Firepower Index
A simple non-attrition modeling technique employs the use of firepower
indices. The purpose of this technique is to aggregate a set of heterogenous elements
of force into a single number representing the combat power of the forces. The
model assigns a unit value to the weapon with the lowest kill potential (such as a
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rifle) and scales the values for the other weapons relative to the lowest valued
weapon. The individual weapon index is then multiplied by the number of weapons
of that type in the force. The sum of the values are compared for each side and the
highest scoring side is assumed to have the greater combat power. The firepower
indexes assigned are generally determined on an historical basis, by examining the
effects of the various weapons relative to other weapons over numerous battles.
The following table is an example of a firepower index model:
FORCE TYPE UNIT VALUE NUMBER OF UNITS INDEX
Infantry 01 200 200
Tanks 20 20 400
APC's 10 10 100
Artillary 15 20 am
TOTAL: 1000
Although this is a better model than just counting the number of forces
on each side, this model suffers from several serious drawbacks. The firepower
indices are static values which do not take into account such factors as effectiveness
in different terrain or environments, mobility, and offensive versus defensive uses.
Another problem is that the indices are assumed to be linear - the sum value of 1
tank + 1 tank = 2 tanks. This discounts the additive firepower effect of multiple
units and the psychological value of advancing with large divisions vice a few tanks.
This linearity also assumes that 100 men are 100 times as effective as a single man,
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neglecting the problems associated with controlling and advancing the much larger
group.
The model also suffers from synergism in that the sum of artillary, tanks,
infantry, etc., is more than just the values assigned to the organic units. This is a
static model which is only effective in comparing the ptntial of two sides. This
model should not be used to describe comat wj t, or to estimate battle outcom--s
or the effect of combat force.
2. Quantitative Judgement Model (QJM)
In the early 1800's the works of Carl Von Clausewitz implied a Law of
Numbers that would model military conflict. This work (QaD ~r) was seen by
Trevor Dupuy (Col. USA, Ret.) to correspond to his Quantitative Judgement Model
(QJM). The QJM was developed in the 1950's to account for a number of factors
which influence the outcome of battle but were not accounted for in the attrition
models presented earlier.
In his recent book, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat
Dupuy derives a combat power formula based on the Law of Numbers of Clausewitz.
The Law of Numbers related combat power (P) to the number of troops available
(N), a term representing the variable factors affecting the force (V), and a value
assigned to the fighting quality of the troops (Q) by the simple relationship: P = N
x V x Q. The QJM combat power formula may be obtained by a three step process
as outlined by Dupuy [Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of Combat
pp. 81-89]:
94
1. Replace the number of troops (N) with force strength (S).
2. Quantify and define the variable factors (V) which influence the
circumstances of combat.
3. Replace the troop quality factor (Q) with a relative Combat Effectiveness
Value (CEV).
The QJM model replaces the force number term with a force manpower
strength term to account for the lethality and effectiveness of all weapons in the
force. The force strength term developed in the QJM is based on historical data and
empirical results to normalize the value over the course of history to obtain
comparative values. Force strength corresponds to combat potential. The QJM
model has determined a finite number of variables affecting the circumstances of
combat, which are classified as either environmental (terrain, weather, etc.), or
operational (posture, mobility, etc.). An historical analysis was performed by Dupuy
to assign to each factor a value based on its importance in combat and its relative
impact on effectiveness. Finally, the CEV is a ratio of predicted outcomes measured
for forces in combat against the actual outcomes and is a substitute for the
Clausewitzian term (Q) in that it is a measure of relative effectiveness of one side's
force against the other due to leadership, training, etc.
The limitations of the QJM lie in the historical approach taken to obtain
the values of (S) and (CEV). This model works well in predicting the outcomes of
historical combats. It has unknown predictive power for future combat scenarios. For
example, it is challenging to obtain a good input for CEV. Where no data was
obtainable or it was unmeasurable, such as for leadership, the values for opposing
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sides were assumed to be equal. The drawback is, of course, shared by all attempts
to analyze future scenarios.
Another significant drawback is that this model considers only those static
factors which affect combat and does not account for the dynamics of combat such
as tactics on the battlefield, or the effects of maneuver and supression. This model
does not solve the problem of distributing force over a battlefield to obtain the best
use of combat power.
E. GRAPHICAL MODELING TECHNIQUES
Students are first exposed to the use of graphs when learning to analyze simple
linear equations. Later this technique is applied to more complicated systems of
linear equations. In their book, A First Course in Mathematical Modeling
Giordano and Weir introduce this technique for modeling more complex
relationships.
The use of graphs to analyze complex issues require that the issues be reduced
to the relationship between a single independent variable and a dependent variable.
In their analysis of the nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union,
Giordano and Weir limited the variables to the number of missiles or warheads
possessed by either country. To model the close interrelation between the two force
structures, the graphs of each country's projected missile requirements to satisfy their
strategies were overlaid. The result is a method of determining the effect of changes
to one country's strategy on the number of weapons required by the other.
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The limitation of this method is analogous to the limitation of the graphical
method of solving simultanious linear equations - the results are very subjective.
This is especially true with the nuclear arms model presented. The actual number
of missiles required to satisfy the friendly strategy of each country in the model is
not explicitly determined. Nor is the survivability index which determineb the actual
slope of the curves used to depict the number of missiles or warheads posessed. The
models presented by Giordano and Weir provide no scale to measure the number
of missiles necessary to achieve stability. Thus the model is beneficial only in
providing a general estimate of the effects (trends) caused by changes to either
county's nuclear strategy.
The model's weakness is also its strength: it provides a quick assessment of the
likely outcome of strategy or policy changes. Similar models can be generated for
other complex military problems. The key is to find the critical relationship
governing the problem and establish the general rules that bounds the relationship
in the given environment.
F. SOVIET CORRELATION OF FORCES AND MEANS (COFM)
The Soviet military has always considered it important to study history to
prepare themselves for war. The result of years of operations research in military
history is the Soviet Correlation of Forces and Means (COFM) model currently in
use in Soviet military doctrine. An article in the Soviet Mitaa Enclodia (1979)
emphasizes that COFM is an operational, tactical, and strategic model used at all
echelons of the soviet military [Dupuy, Understanding War: History and Theory of
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Combat pp. 39-50]. The aim of COFM is to predict the fighting power of both sides,
based on a correlation of the forces available to each side and the means required
to achieve stated objectives, in order to predetermine the probable victor.
According to Soviet doctrine, a COFM margin is determined at all levels of
operation and along all fronts of a battle prior to any action occurring. As a battle
progresses the model is frequently updated and if an insufficient margin is
determined to exist at any location then forces are shifted appropriately to enhance
the margin to ensure victory while still maintaining sufficiency at all other locations.
The COFM model also takes into account variables such as: training,
experience of command, motivation, reconnaissance capabilities, etc., which are
related on both sides as a numerical value, or simply as "superior" or "inferior". As
with QJM, these values are difficult to obtain a priori.
The limitation of this model lies in the strict adherence to the margin of
superiority at all fronts. When the margin drops below a predetermined value,
doctrine says that action must be taken to enhance the margin or else the mission
will not be successful. With so heavy a reliance on the statistical nature of combat
prior to an engagement, the COFM model does not recognize the ability of an
outnumbered unit to excel in the face of battle and overcome the odds to win the
battle. The uncertainty associated with combat is not recognized as being sufficient
to turn a losing margin into a victorious engagement.
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G. REVIEW QUESTIONS
1. List in order of importance three factors which affect a commander's decision
to retreat in battle.
2. Why is it difficult for the effects of suppression to be quantified using current
modeling techniques? Why is suppression of concern to commanders on the
battlefield if the results are not readily measurable?
3. Historically, what percentage of losses is a commander likely to accept before
retreating or starendering? How can this percentage of losses be useful in the
attrition models studied so far?
4. How can the use of firepower indices be used to evaluate what we defined
in the theory of combat as combat potential? Which of the two potentials
does it most likely measure?
5. What are the limitations of the firepower index modeling technique? Are
these limitations serious?
6. How does the Quantitative Judgement Model (QJM) alleviate some of the
problems with the firepower index model?
7. If graphical models described by Weir provide no quantitative results, then
what value is there in applying his techniques? Evaluate the usefulness of
graphical techniques with regard to good model characteristics given in
Chapter III of the text?
8. Given your understanding of the usefulness and practicality of combat
modeling, analyze the Soviet use of the COFM technique with respect to:
decision making, reliability, accuracy, etc.
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Introduce the student to the models, simulation, and wargames that are
currently in use by the various services. Provide basic information about the models
and explain how the models have been used to make C2 decisions (as decision aids).
OBJECTIVES:
* Have an understanding of the contents, purpose and use of the following




* Understand the principles of Chaos Theory




1. Hughes, W. P., and J. A. Larson, 'Me Falldands Wargame", Appendix G.
2. Artigiani, and Gaffney, "Chaos and Command: Contemporary Science and
Leadership in the Nelson Style".
3. Moughon, J.C., A Decision Aid Model ForA Maneuver Force Commander That
Incorporates The Quantified Judgement Model, Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey California, March 1989.
4. Gaver, D.P., "Naval Tactical Decisions Under Uncertainty: Some Case
Studies," Naval Research Reviews.
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A. JANUS(T)
Janus(T) is a high resolution combat simulation developed by the US Army
Training and Doctrine Command to support the analysis of hardware system
development efforts, employment methodology, and tactics. Additionally, the model
is used to support troop training. The model functions as a Cost and Operational
Effectiveness Analysis tool, one of the categories of model uses listed in MQ
Modeling [Hughes, Military Modeling pp. 225-2261.
The Janus(T) model employs discrete event simulation to represent the
exchange of combat power between two opposing forces. Probability techniques are
used to determine the combat outcomes. It models individual combat elements vice
aggregated units. This allows for the assessment of the impact of a single weapon
platform on the operational effectiveness of a force in combat, as well as the
interaction of several weapons systems employed within a given theater.
The model is highly hardware and software intensive. The system
documentation identifies a requirement for at least a Micro-VAX II minicomputer
with a variety of peripherals and 85,000 lines of Fortran code, in addition to various
utility and database handling routines.
B. INTERIM BATI'LE GROUP TACTICAL TRAINER (RESA)
The Interim Battle Group Tactical Trainer (IBGTF), also known as the RESA
model at the Naval Postgraduate School, provides an opportunity to train
participants on the importance of command and control in naval operations. The
model uses discrete event simulation to war game two opposing naval battle group
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forces. A controller position oversees the game and may play the role of the orange
force commander.
Each force has several consoles, both geographic and alphanumeric, which
allow interaction with the system database and controller. Each position is provided
intelligence information from the system database. Additional information may be
gained by the proper use of organic surveillance systems and communications with
other players. Failure to pass information between players will result in an
incomplete picture of the battle situation and complicate attempts to properly
control forces.
The model simulates the operations of opposing naval battle units, simulating
the actions of aircraft and ships based upon inputs from participants. Command of
some individual units, such as aircraft or launch facilities, are subject to the real time
constraints of logistics requirements (e.g., refueling, etc.). These and other factors
complicate the decision making process. On the whole RESA, or IBGTT, is effective
and offers the trainees an opportunity to make command decisions in an atmosphere
of stress and limited information.
C. CONTINGENCY FORCE ANALYSIS WARGAME (CFAW)
The Contingency Force Analysis Wargame (CFAW) described in the U.S.
Army Concepts Analysis Agency document, "The FaIldands Wargame", is a force-
on-force, attrition based model which can be used by the Army Concepts Analysis
Agency to evaluate the reasonableness of operation and contingency plans for joint
forces at the theater level. The model supports testing of plans to meet
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hypothesized scenarios, ranging over various terrain areas specified by the players.
The CFAW models the interaction of a variety of combat and combat support
functions ranging from intelligence and logistics to ground and air combat. The
combat potential of each opponent is generated from a database built by the players
at the initiation of the game. Characteristics of each weapon system, to include
probability of target acquisition and kill and target value, are provided by the players
and the model uses this information to generate combat outcomes in company,
battalion, or brigade size units at discrete intervals. Resulting force strengths are
compared to preset percentage levels to determine the net posture of the two
opponents. Should a unit strength fall below a predetermined value (e.g., 25%)
relative to its initial level, it is automatically removed from further play.
The model does not make any command and control decisions. While this may
appear to be a limitation of the model, it requires the players to recognize critical
decision points and take action to redirect their forces. Since the model has the
capability to be replayed from any point, the effects of different decisions can be
played and the outcomes compared. However, the model is highly probabilistic and
a given decision may not result in the same outcome each time the model is played.
D. CHAOS THEORY
Chaos theory is one of the latest theories being applied to combat analysis by
military analysts. In their paper "Chaos And Command: Contemporary Science and
Leadership in the Nelson Style", Artigiani and Gaffney examine the highly successful
leadership style of the English Admiral Horatio Nelson within the context of chaos
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theory. The paper examines how a leader can instill a common idea of how a battle
should be fought and then gives his subordinate commanders sweeping authority to
exercise their initiative as they see fit to accomplish the objectives of the battle.
This "chaotic" style of leadership proved to be very successful for Admiral Nelson
and his "band of brothers" in his various battles at sea, and is an excellent example
of how the chaos theory model can be applied to think about combat.
E. DECISION AIDS
While decision aids have been used for many years to support tactical decision
making, the complexity of the models used has evolved considerably from the early
implementation of the maneuvering board aboard naval vessels. The advent of
microcomputers and database management systems has led to the development of
computer-based decision support systems to enable commanders to assess large
volumes of information and make better decisions.
In his thesis, "A Decision Model for a Maneuver Force Commander That
Incorporates the Quantified Judgment Model", James Coleman Moughon developed
a methodology for using the U.S. Army's force readiness assessment tool, Unit Status
Report (USR), to generate input values into Dupuy's Quantified Judgment Model.
Moughon's effort included generating acceptable opposing force compositions, using
linear programming techniques, which were subsequently input to the Janus model.
The opposing forces where gamed to determine the force ratio at which the battle
would turn in favor of one or the other force. By using the USR data for given
units, the breakpoint force ratios predicted by Janus, and Moughon's decision tool,
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a commander may be able to better predict the outcome of a battle, and thus assess
the likelihood of achieving his objective. However, the breakpoint values are highly
dependent upon actual force structuring and scenario construction.
Several personnel at the Naval Postgraduate School have developed decision
aids as part of their individual work efforts. Professor D.P. Gaver describes three
of them in his article on decision aids. In particular, these apply probability and
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IX. COMMAND AND CONTROL SUMMARY REMARKS
AIM:
Relate the concepts presented to the role of command and control. Ensure the
student recognizes the importance of combat modeling techniques and analysis of
results in the accomplishment of combat missions and objectives. Relate the course
in combat modeling to future courses to be taken in the Joint Command, Control
and Communications Curriculum.
OBJECTIVES:
* Relate command and control to a decision process
Discuss the commander's distribution of combat power spatially, temporally,
and functionally
Understand the application of combat modeling to the goals of combat
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A. ROLE OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
The purpose of this course has been to give the student a perspective of
combat models based on a theory of combat and a set of definitions for command
and control. At this point the concepts must be tied together so that the students of
command and control, for whom this text was prepared, understand the importance
of the role of combat modeling with respect to other courses in a command and
control curriculum.
No matter what definitions are used to discuss command and control, the
underlying concept is that a command and control system is an extension of a
commander's decision process by means of equipment, procedures, etc. Recall that
in Chapter II "command" is a function which deals with organization, motivation,
decision, and execution. "Command and control" is the process by which the
commander makes decisions in order to perform his functions.
B. DISTRIBUTION OF COMBAT POWER
The final conclusion from Chapter II was that the commander's actions create
combat power by activating combat potential. The purpose of the command and
control process can be expressed as the commander's ability to operationally
distribute his combat power spatially, temporally, and functionally in order to
accomplish his mission. An effective command and control process results in the
proper allocation of combat potential to generate the combat power which achieves
the objectives or aims of the unit.
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The role of combat models is to help the commander examine the situation
before him to help him distribute the available forces in his command. Neither a
model or anyone on the commander's staff can replace the commander's intuition
or estimate of the situation in the face of combat or ignore the importance of this
estimate in historical conflicts. But a combat model as a decision aid will provide
a commander with information to help him in assessing the situation, allowing him
to effectively distribute his combat potential.
C. GOALS OF COMBAT
In his paper "Command and Control Within a Theory of Combat", Wayne
Hughes proposed three combat goals in order of importance:
1. Achieve the assigned mission;
2. Achieve the mission at reasonable costs;
3. Recognize mission accomplishment in terms of means and ends.
The importance of combat models can be examined from the perspective of each of
these goals.
In assigning a subordinate a mission or objective, the superior commander must
first assess the situation and determine how many units will be required to
accomplish the mission (how much force must be assigned to succeed). The superior
commander may have his own intuitive feeling for the situation but he must be able
to process intelligence data and other information and determine the potential
required.
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In contrast with the superior commander, a tactical commander executes his
orders and completes his mission using a number of "tools": tactical decision aids,
doctrine based upon simulation, his operation order, guidance based upon
environmental factors, etc. The successful commander will not only arrive at a
decision by applying the most appropriate decision aid but will also understand the
derivation of the aid in order to correct for his personal assessment of the situation.
As pointed out by Robert McQuie (see Chapter VII), most battles fought in
history rarely resulted in the complete destruction of the opposing force. A
commander faced with achieving an objective wants to be able to determine what
"costs" he will permit in attempting to complete his mission. Once again, the
commander must be able to examine the situation and use some sort of guide for
determining whether his assessment of losses (change in potential) is acceptable in
the accomplishment of the mission. If the change is too costly he must change
tactics, redistribute his potential or reassess his original estimate of losses he can
afford in the accomplishment of the mission, to ensure the mission is achieved. All
of the available measures rely on the commander's ability to look ahead, not so
much to "predict the future" as to weigh the odds and determine the possible
outcomes for various scenarios. As Damon Runyon said:
The race is not always to the swift. The battle is not always to the strong. But
that's the way to bet.
Analysis helps decide how to "place your bets."
The determination of when a mission is finished or whether or not an objective
has been met depends largely on the commander's assessment of the situation.
Throughout the later chapters of this text, the results of Lanchester-type attrition
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models have been shown lacking in ability to account for the effects of such
significant concepts of: territory gained or lost, suppression, maneuverability,
domination, and surprise. It becomes apparent that the outcome of a battle often
must be measured in terms other than attrition. The role of the commander is to
determine the processes which will help him to achieve dominance over his enemy
by effective distribution of forces spatially, temporally and functionally.
D. COMBAT ANALYSIS AND THE C3 CURRICULUM
The purpose of this course is not to generate operations analysts who are
experts in creating combat models. Rather, the course is designed for students in the
study of command and control to emphasize the importance of combat modeling in
the command and control process, and understand what factors determine whether
or not a model is adequate in different situations to help with decisions and their
execution. The course emphasizes the applicability of different modeling techniques
in different combat environments to generate useful decision aids for commanders.
In subsequent courses in C2 Architecture Design and C2 Systems Analysis, the
student should be able to see the application of combat modeling and analysis
techniques. In designing a C2 architecture the goal is to determine the needs of the
commander and to design an organization which will aid him in his decision making
and execution effectiveness. The proper development of an organization directly
affects the commander's ability to motivate and activate his forces, in order to
distribute the forces and monitor the execution of his decisions.
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Systems design and analysis must be based on the effectiveness of systems to
help increase the combat power of forces. Models which evaluate the usefulness and
effectiveness of systems in the generation and distribution of combat power are
based on the techniques presented in this text. Proper model selection and analysis
for a system's design and development can save the taxpayers the cost oi poor
systems and prove the need for, and effectiveness of, good ones.
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